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ABSTRACT
A BRIDGE AND ENGINE ROOM STAFFING AND SCHEDULING MODEL
FOR ROBUST MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT IN THE LITTORAL COMBAT
SHIPS
John P. Cordle
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. T. Steven Cotter

The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships were designed to be relatively small surface vessels for
operations near a littoral shore theater. These ships were envisioned to be highly automated,
networked, agile, stealthy surface combatants capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric
threats in the littorals with minimum manpower.

To date, however, some of these ships have

experienced significant engineering and propulsion plant failures that impacted mission
accomplishment and were attributable, at least in part, to under staffing and over scheduling the
human component of the automation-human operational environment.

The critical human

components on the Littoral Combat Ship are bridge and engine room staffing.

Since the

engineering plant has been the source of most major failures to date, this project sought to develop
an engine room staffing and scheduling model for the Littoral Combat Ship class given a stated set
of minimum mission objectives when operating under normal conditions – called “Condition III
Underway Steaming”, which is used as the basis for official Navy manning calculations, and to
provide recommendations for improved automation-human modeling. A survey of the crew of
several LCS ships was conducted and the results were analyzed using exploratory data analysis
and multiple joint correspondence analysis. Results of the survey analysis were applied to the
design of a joint physical-cognitive-automation workflow analysis of critical procedures and
failure modes as they map to four dimensions: fatigue, watch and maintenance tasking, and
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automation-human interface. Workflow analysis results were then simulated in an IMPRINT
model of a typical watch period, and the results were evaluated against the four dimensions of the
survey. The project validated that the four dimensions analyzed are indeed worthy of consideration
in manpower models, and that IMPRINT has the potential, with a few modifications, to model
joint physical-cognitive-automation workflows as an improvement to the current manpower-only
models used in Navy ship design by accounting for human factors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

TECHNICAL FORMULATION
The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships were designed to be relatively small surface vessels for

operations near a littoral shore theater. These ships were envisioned to be highly automated,
networked, agile, stealthy surface combatants capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric
threats in the littorals with minimum manpower. Most of the mission functions are performed by
carried vehicles such as helicopters or unmanned vehicles such as the Spartan Scout, AN/WLD-1
RMS Remote Mine hunting System and MQ-8B Fire Scout as part of the Navy’s goal to “unman
the front lines.” To date, however, some of these ships have experienced significant failures in
mission accomplishment which have been, at least in part, attributable to understaffing and
overscheduling the human component of the automation-human operational environment. In one
case, an LCS had seawater leak into one of its main diesel propulsion systems and was forced to
return to port for repairs. In another, an LCS ship suffered propulsion issues after engineers
attempted to use gears without adequately oiling them. The subsequent damage cost $23 million
to repair, according to the Navy (Gallagher, March 2014). Based on these casualties, this project
focused on what appears to be the critical human component of the Littoral Combat Ship: engine
room staffing.
The IMPRINT model is designed to start with a defined set of mission requirements as
specified by the user and a set of attributes that could influence the ability of the platform (defined
as the combination of the ship or “sea-frame”, the mission module, and the crew) to accomplish
the mission. Measures of effectiveness must be determined and entered into the model to ensure
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that all nodes are identified and adequately described.

As discussed above, engineering is

common to all mission areas; in previous Naval Postgraduate School studies (Kerno 2015,
Meredith 2016), this module is the most developed, listed as the most likely to be vulnerable to
the impact of fatigue and overtasking, and based on this author’s experience, the most likely to be
capable of being studied in real-life situations. Previous IMPRINT projects have used the Forces
Model function, which creates a more global force level manpower study, in which “workload” is
just simple engagement with high level activities. This study differs in that it looks at a detailed
human performance scenario using Operations Model, where workload is defined as the mental
capacity being utilized to perform more definitive tasks. The detailed human performance models
allow the analyst measure outcomes such as mission times, mission completion, and errors and
their consequences as metrics.

1.2

PROJECT PURPOSE
This project sought to develop a bridge and engine room staffing and scheduling model

for the Littoral Combat Ship class given a stated set of minimum mission objectives when
operating under normal conditions and varying littoral combat environments. Specific steps of
this process:
a. Identifying a stated set of mission objectives under normal and combat littoral
environments.
b. Decomposing the set of mission objectives into bridge and engine room functional
performance requirements using IMPRINT and modeling tools.
c. Performing root cause analysis of mission accomplishment failure modes in the littoral
class of combat ships.
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d. Identifying existing staffing and scheduling models and comparing their functional
strengths and weaknesses to the engine room functional requirements.
e. Selecting an existing or developing a new staffing and scheduling model that fits the
engine room human-automation environment functional requirements.
f. Testing and refining the proposed littoral combat ship engine room staffing and
scheduling model in the IMPRINT virtual environment to verify attainment of the
identified stated set of mission objectives.
g. Documenting the model, making recommendations for validation of mission objectives
accomplishment, and transferring to the Navy for use in normal and combat littoral
environments.
The project is designed to assist the Navy in developing a more accurate and precise model
for manning the LCS by examining the impact of maintenance, operations, watch standing, and
other design factors on the LCS ability to accomplish the mission. In doing so, savings could be
realized in the manning of the crew, which is one of the most expensive factors in ship design.
Cost for this project was negligible, since much of the shipboard research was already funded and
documented by Naval Postgraduate School students and was leveraged for this project. Savings
may take time to be realized and may be more in terms of “cost avoidance” than in actual monetary
savings. Potential savings could be realized in avoiding future engineering failures through better
modeling, which, based on previous failures, could be in excess of several million dollars and
hundreds of lost operating days. One could be the cost (once available) of the two past significant
failures. Another potential benefit could be an improvement to the design of the ship’s bridge and
engineering control station that result in better command and control and perhaps reduce the risk
of damage or mission degradation. Finally, if the IMPRINT model proves to be a good fit for such
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analysis of smaller crewed ships, it could be adopted by the Navy as a design model for future
classes such as the new Frigate and the DDG-1000 class of ship, potentially saving significant
time, cost, and effort in the design and manning of these vessels. If there is a desire to validate the
results of this project using in-situ data collection and actual performance measures, cost estimates
are provided Table 1 (rows with no cost have been deleted for space considerations).

Item

Planned Expenditures

Remarks/ Clarifying Explanation

Equipment

22,500

Motion loggers

Contracts

45,000

NRC Postdoc

Travel

8,000

1 visit to sponsor (3 people); 1 underway

Labor

15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)

FY16Qtr 1 Total
Equipment

2,000

Labor

Equipment and batteries
15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)

FY16Qtr 2 Total
Equipment

2,000

Labor

Equipment and batteries
15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)

FY16Qtr 3 Total
Equipment

1,000

Equipment and batteries

Travel

6,000

1 visit to sponsor (3 people)

Labor

15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)

FY16Qtr 4 Total
Total Equipment

27,500

Total Travel

14,000

Total Labor

114,257.68

Total Contract

45,000

Total Overhead

0

Grand Total

60 days (PI) 100 days (Research Assistant)

$200,757.68

Table 1. Estimated Cost Breakdown of potential in-situ study.
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1.3

PROBLEM STATEMENT
This project sought to address the problem: “What is the optimum manning and schedule

for Littoral Combat Ship Class engine room personnel to minimize significant failures in mission
accomplishment attributable to understaffing and over scheduling the human component in the
automaton-human operational environment?”

1.4

SYSTEMIC PROBLEM CONTEXT
The foundational document for all Navy ships is called the Required Operational

Capabilities (ROC) and Planned Operational Environment (POE) document (OPNAVINST
3501.352A April 2014). It is a very high-level document and does not provide a detailed task
element list beyond the specific supporting elements for each mission area. For the focus areas
pertaining to this study, a better set of tasks is found in the Engineering Operating Sequencing
System (EOSS), which detail engineering operating procedures and casualty actions. There are
several potential methods to decompose these actions into discrete tasks. After considering each
during the developmental phase of the project, the Hierarchal Task Analysis method was selected
as being to most applicable to IMPRINT modeling, primarily since it has the most attributes that
allow analysis of human-equipment interfaces. Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is a systematic
method of describing how work is organized in order to meet the overall objective of the job. It
involves identifying in a top down fashion the overall goal of the task, then the various sub-tasks
and the conditions under which they should be carried out to achieve that goal. In this way,
complex planning tasks can be represented as a hierarchy of operations – different things that
people must do within a system and plans – the conditions which are necessary to undertake these
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operations. A short description of the other potential methods considered was taken from Embrey
(2000).
a. Operator Action Event Trees (OAET) are tree-like diagrams which represent the
sequence of various decisions and actions that the operating team is expected to
perform when confronted with a particular process event. Any omissions of such
decisions and actions can also be modeled together with their consequences for plant
safety.
b. Decision/Action flow diagrams (DA) are flow charts which show the sequence of
action steps and questions to be considered in complex tasks which involve decisionmaking. Decision/Action Flow Diagrams are similar to the flow charts used in
computer program development. Both charts are based on binary choice decisions and
intervening operations. In general, the binary decision logic in Decision/Action charts
expedites communications through the use of simple conventions and provides for easy
translation of Decision/Action charts into logic flow charts for computerized sections
of the system.
c. Critical Action and Decision Evaluation Technique (CADET) is built on the critical
actions or decisions (CADs) that need to be made by the operator usually in response
to some developing abnormal state of the plant. A CAD is defined in terms of its
consequences. If a CAD fails, it will have a significant effect on safety, production or
availability.
d. The Influence Modeling and Assessment Systems (IMAS) technique is used to elicit
Subjective Cause-Consequence Models (SCCM) of process abnormalities from
personnel, a SCCM is a graphical representation of the perceptions of the operating
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team regarding the various alternative causes that could have given rise to the
disturbance and the various consequences which could arise from the situation.
HTA was selected as the primary framework for the LCS model in this analysis for the
following reasons:.
a. HTA is an economical method of gathering and organizing information since the
hierarchical description needs only to be developed up to the point where it is needed
for the purposes of the analysis.
b. The hierarchical structure of HTA enables the analyst to focus on crucial aspects of the
task, which can have an impact on plant safety.
c. When used as an input to design, HTA allows functional objectives to be specified at
the higher levels of the analysis prior to final decisions being made about the hardware.
This is important when allocating functions between personnel and automatic systems.
d. HTA is best developed as a collaboration between the task analyst and people involved
in operations. Thus, the analyst develops the description of the task in accordance with
the perceptions of line personnel who are responsible for effective operation of the
system.
e. HTA can be used as a starting point for using various error analysis methods to examine
the error potential in the performance of the required operations.
Conversely, the two primary disadvantages of Hierarchical Task Analysis are:
a. The analyst needs to develop a measure of skill in order to analyze the task effectively
since the technique is not a simple procedure that can be applied immediately.
However, the necessary skills can be acquired reasonably quickly through practice.
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b. Because HTA has to be carried out in collaboration with workers, supervisors and
engineers, it entails commitment of time and effort from busy people
There are other more cognitive approaches that may be better suited to the final analysis,
but for the initial deconstruction of the bridge and engine room, HTA is a good technique to
establish initial task structure. For this study, the following deconstruction model was used as a
baseline, to be tailored to the engineering plant and watch teams. The basic structure is outlined in
Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Mission-Task Decomposition

To apply the principles of HTA in IMPRINT, the Operations Analysis is broken into
“Missions” which define a finite time period and desired outcome; “Functions”, which are large
procedures (corresponding to “tasks” in the HTA breakout above); and “Tasks”, which are the
steps in a procedure and allow for detailed human factors and cognitive analysis. The hierarchy
will be apparent in the Results section as IMPRINT graphs are used to validate the workflow
models as shown in the below Engineering Task Summary:
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Mission: Watch Period: Safely operate the engineering plant
a.

b.

Function: Operate Propulsion Equipment
i.

Task: Start up equipment

ii.

Task: Perform periodic maintenance

iii.

Task: Monitor operation

iv.

Task: Secure equipment

Function: Operate Electric Plant
i.

Task: Start up equipment

ii.

Task: Perform periodic maintenance

iii.

Task: Monitor operation

iv. Task: Secure equipment
c.

Function: Conduct Casualty Control
i.

Task: Take immediate casualty actions

ii.

Task: Restore equipment to safe condition

iii.

Task: Conduct follow-up actions

iv.

Task: Restore to original condition

There are two primary systemic delimitations for this project. Although there is significant
failure data available in the ship’s Consolidated Maintenance Database, the data available for
causality of the failures is relatively incomplete. There is sufficient data (approximately 6 years’
worth) for analysis, and this represents a large focus of effort in defining the ties between failure
(quantitative data) and causes of failure (qualitative analysis). Second, this project is tied to similar
experiments with the IMPRINT software program, which may not turn out to be the ideal vehicle,
but it has the most potential at this stage of development. As one example, Meredith (2016) noted
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that to date IMPRINT has only been applied to very small crews (5 or less) while the LCS crew
size is 50, and IMPRINT has largely been applied to relatively static conditions. Meredith’s project
expanded the environmental factors to include more dynamic operational events such as unplanned
flight or boat operations, and significant casualties. To address these limitations in this research
project, a detailed task structure was developed for the IMPRINT model for the engineering watch
team and is proposed for the purposes of this product to the Navy representatives. This task model
deconstructs the tasks into individual task elements at a detailed level by watch stander, maintainer,
and system. If gaps in historical failure data are found, they can be identified and targeted for
collection efforts in the follow-on phases of the project during underway periods that are planned.
Finally, the intention in this project was to examine possible improvements to the IMPRINT model
and to note any areas that may require reconsideration or modification of the model to better fit
the scope and purpose of the experiment.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1

REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS (LCS)
The LCS mission is to operate offensively in the high-density, multi-threat littoral

environment independently or as an integral member of a carrier strike group (CSG), expeditionary
strike group (ESG), or surface action group (OPNAV, LCS Concept of Operations, 2003). A
distinguishing feature of LCS is the concept of a modular, reconfigurable ship. There are two ship
classes: Freedom class and Independence class. Although the two classes are very different in
design, each meets a common set of key performance parameters. The ship is comprised of a ship
system (basic hull, mechanical, electrical, and computing systems) and core systems that provide
navigation, self-defense, command and communication (C2) and communications capabilities, as
well as air, subsurface, and surface vehicle launch, recovery, handling, and control systems. The
core systems provide the ship with the capability to detect, identify, track, and defend itself against
anti-ship cruise missiles and threat aircraft, but the ship is not designed or intended to operate in a
high-intensity air defense environment unless these operations are being conducted under the air
defense coverage of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), or an air
defense asset such as an Aegis cruiser or destroyer. The ship includes a large reconfigurable
volume for Mission Packages (MP), which may be exchanged to modify the ship’s focused war
fighting capability. Designed as an open architecture ship with tailored MP, LCS provides focused
capabilities in the mine countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), or antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) mission areas. The SUW MP includes a maritime security module, which enables
visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) compliant and low freeboard non-compliant capability.
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The MP include personnel required to operate and maintain mission specific equipment and to
augment the core crew when conducting focused mission operations. In addition to its focusedmission and self-defense capabilities, LCS may be tasked to conduct operations that take
advantage of its inherent capabilities, defined as those capabilities enabled by the ship’s core
systems, sprint speed, agility, mission bay space, and shallow draft. These may include operations
such as special operations forces (SOF) support, search and rescue (SAR), freedom of navigation
operations, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), global fleet station, maritime law
enforcement operations, and irregular warfare. LCS is designed to operate in the littoral
environment as a focused mission ship, which can be configured with SUW, ASW, or MCM MPs.
Mission Packages (MPs) are integrated with the ship’s services, data links, unmanned vehicle
controls and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence infrastructure. The
MPs are transportable by ship or air, built for rapid reconfigurability and must be changed out in
port. The MPs include personnel to support mission capabilities and to augment the core crew for
tasks such as FP, watch standing, and administration. LCS provides self-defense against anti-ship
cruise missiles, threat aircraft and surface threats. Due to its core systems, speed, agility and
shallow draft characteristics, LCS provides the inherent capability to conduct a number of
secondary missions on a limited basis, including Special Operations Forces (SOF) support, Search
and Rescue (SAR), afloat forward staging base, freedom of navigation operations, global fleet
station, maritime law enforcement operations, and irregular warfare. Engineering performance is
critical to mission accomplishment across all MP’s and is thus a viable target outcome as a failure
in this area would impact or even eliminate mission accomplishment.
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In breaking down the task analysis, this research focused on specific operational conditions
and subsets for modeling. The LCS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) defines three operating
conditions for conducting operations:
a.

Condition I: Battle Readiness. While in Condition I, the ship shall meet the following
criteria:
(1)

Able to perform assigned focused mission area (SUW, ASW, or MCM) when
configured with respective MP and perform limited non-MP related mission
areas, or inherent capabilities, simultaneously.

(2)

Able to keep the required systems manned and operating for maximum
effectiveness.

(3)

Required to accomplish only maintenance associated with mission critical
repairs.

(4)

Evolutions such as replenishment, law enforcement, or non-mission helicopter
operations are not applicable.

(5)
b.

The maximum expected continuous crew endurance for Condition I is 24 hours.

Condition II: Modified Battle Readiness. Condition II is Condition I modified to meet
particular probable threats that are situation-dependent. As such, Condition II is a
subset of condition I that stands up particular Condition I capabilities at the discretion
of the commanding officer. While in Condition II, the ship shall meet the following
criteria:
(1) Able to perform focused mission (SUW, ASW, or MCM) areas when
configured with respective MP.
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(2) Able to simultaneously perform those offensive and defensive functions
necessary to counter specific probable, limited threats.
(3) Able to keep required operational systems continuously manned and operating.
(4) Able to perform other command and control (C2) functions relevant to the
threats which are not required to be accomplished simultaneously.
(5) Able to accomplish mission critical maintenance and support functions.
(6) The maximum expected continuous duration for Condition II is 10 consecutive
days, with a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of rest provided per crewmember per day.
c.

Condition III: Wartime/Increased Tension/Forward Deployed Cruising Readiness.
Reduced defensive systems are manned to a level sufficient to counter possible
threats. While in condition III, the ship shall meet the following criteria:
(1) Able to keep installed and embarked focused mission (SUW or ASW or MIW)
systems manned and operating as necessary to conform with prescribed ROCs.
(2) Able to accomplish all underway maintenance, support and administrative
functions.
(3) To determine manpower requirements, the maximum expected crew endurance
for Condition III is 21 consecutive days underway, with opportunity for 8 hours
of rest provided per man per day, followed by 4 days in port.

Since the key failures appear to have occurred during Condition III, this is the most
applicable condition and was used for the analysis in this project.
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2.2

OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS
The IMPRINT program has been applied in the past to smaller combat equipment such as

tanks. Its application to the complex shipboard environment is not yet proven, although a previous
phase of this experiment has shown it to be capable of mapping basic LCS crew functionality and
operations under Condition III as described in paragraph 2.1.c. In a more global force level
manpower study, “workload” is just simple engagement with high level activities. In a detailed
human performance model, workload is the mental capacity being utilized to perform more
definitive tasks. The detailed human performance models allow observation of outcomes such as
mission times, mission completion, and errors and their consequences as metrics. The modeling of
complex operations under varying conditions was challenging, but the measures of effectiveness
in the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Planned Operational Environment (POE)
document provides a stable set of criteria with a well-defined structure that seems to lend itself to
the IMPRINT model’s capabilities. Data collection during real live operations may be subject to
operational and funding limitations, but the initial plan does account for a great deal of flexibility
in the conduct of the study. The IMPRINT Operations Model allows the operator to analyze the
performance (such as time, accuracy, and workload) of a new weapon system by helping build
models of each mission that the weapon system is capable of accomplishing. Models are built by
breaking down the mission into a network of procedures defined as “functions”. Each of the
functions is then further broken down into a network consisting of individual “tasks”. When the
program executes the mission model simulation, the analyst can study the range of results that
occur in the mission. A description of the variability of each element can be obtained for further
analysis. IMPRINT Pro performs the simulation model based on how long it takes (based on
programmer input) to perform each task in the mission. In addition, with each task, the analyst can
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estimate accuracy levels and assign workload values that reflect the amount of effort the
Warfighters will have to expend to perform the task. During the simulation, IMPRINT Pro predicts
task performance and calculates how much workload each Warfighter experienced throughout the
mission. In this way, it is possible to determine whether the Warfighter were overloaded, and if so,
how changes can be made to reduce the workload to an acceptable level. At the completion of the
simulation, IMPRINT Pro can compare the minimum acceptable mission performance time and
accuracy to the predicted performance. This method was used to determine whether the mission
met its performance requirements. Past researchers have modeled the LCS crews in a macro sense
using the Force Unit model, which looks at how a Force Unit, a structured set of resources
comprised of people and equipment, can succeed in meeting an emergency which demands those
resources.

Using the model developed by previous researchers, this analysis utilized the

Operations Model and a small subset of tasks in detail to investigate the effects of the
aforementioned dimensions.
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CHAPTER 3
PROJECT METHODOLOGY

3.1

PROJECT DESIGN
Data collection plan: Since this engineering effort did not have direct access to the LCS

automation-human operational environment, a directed, nonrandom survey was conducted to
assess potential automation, human, and environmental variables contributing to observed failures.
Once the key attributes were decided upon for the chosen mission, and the attributes to be entered
determined, the method of measuring data was submitted and approved by the Old Dominion
University Batten College of Engineering and Technology Internal Review Board as IRB 9212382, Littoral Combat Ship Staffing Model using IMPRINT, on 15 August 2016. Inputs included
objective (mission hours, mission objectives, achievement of specific milestones from the ship’s
Required Operating Condition (ROC) document), and specific parameters that pertain to the
mission itself – ranges, success in mine location, etc. Finally, the crew was surveyed in terms of
skills, experience, training level, proficiency, and in terms of performance – fatigue, workload,
error rate, etc. Due to the focused scope of the project, although surveys were completed by a
variety of shipboard personnel, the focus was on a single key node, the engine room, since this is
the area where the majority of decision-making occurs with the most severe potential
consequences. These parameters were fed into the model and refined to see if the results are
repeatable and predictable to a degree that the model was validated.
In-Situ measurements: Although this project does not include an in-situ research aspect,
the authors had access to significant data that was collected in numerous Naval Postgraduate
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School studies (Kerno 2015, Meredith 2016). This data was reviewed and referenced as necessary
to support or refute the findings of the LCS survey and other aspects of the analysis.
Recommendations and adjustments: Based on the validated model, the opportunity existed
to adjust several of the attributes already inherent in the IMPRINT program to more closely tailor
them to actual Navy parameters and use the results to formulate recommendations for changes to
the model itself. One final desired outcome was the ability to modify the IMPRINT model so that
it can be used in a predictive fashion for new ships such as the next generation Frigate FFG(X),
which is the follow-on class to the LCS, and even the DDG-1000 class, which will face many of
the same challenges. The challenge is that unlike LCS, these are more multi-mission ships and
may require several iterations of the IMPRINT analysis, as well as analyzing the interactions
between mission areas.

3.2

MISSION PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION
The LCS bridge is composed of a system of systems that integrate to provide command

and control (in Navy terminology, “C2” that includes radars, cameras and visual operators to build
a coherent surface and air picture of land, obstructions, and other air and surface vessels to support
safe navigation and safe operations. Unlike other classes of ship, the bridge system was designed
from the ground up as an integrated “open architecture” system, with automated computercontrolled functions augmenting the human crew and in many cases replacing crew members
required on other surface ships. This includes such systems as surface and air search radars,
electronic navigation systems, and propulsion control systems that all culminate in a central Bridge
Control Station from which an Officer of the Deck can change displays and control the ship with
commands from a joystick and computer touch screen. In designing the LCS Crew Survey, visits
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were made to actual LCS ships and to the LCS simulator/trainer to examine the human-automation
interface and provide familiarization with the procedures and construct of the Integrated Bridge
System (IBS).

Figure 2. Schematic of LCS Integrated Bridge System (IBS) (Source: US Navy)

3.3

ANALYSIS OF BRIDGE AND ENGINEROOM ARCHITECTURES
The Engine room of the LCS ships is designed for minimal manning, with most control

functions residing at a watch station on the bridge. Since the majority of engineering functions are
automated, only one individual is assigned to roam the engineering spaces as a monitor and
casualty responder for fires, flooding, etc. One class is a combined gas turbine and diesel
propulsion system with a reduction gear (called a “combining gear in LCS) and the other with a
rotating water jet propulsion system. The systems are unique to the LCS platform and are
supported by a robust simulator training program called Train to Qualify (TTQ) such that almost
all functions required to operate the engineering plant can be performed on a simulator exactly as
they work on the ship. While the control station is located on the bridge, that individual is not
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considered an integral member of the bridge watch team and is focused exclusively on engineering
plant control. The functional interface for both the IBS and the Engineering systems are separate
but similar in design. The majority of functions are controlled by an operator sitting in front of a
series of computer monitors with touch-screen capability, using “soft buttons” on the screen to
perform most actions such as starting and stopping pumps, closing and opening breakers, and
aligning valves. A large number of alarms relay the status of doors, valves, machines, and
casualties such as fire and flooding via installed sensors. The displays are essentially detailed
“status boards” from which the operator can monitor parameters such as temperature, pressure,
RPM, etc., selected by a series of menus and buttons on the screen. Most operating procedures are
contained in paper booklets that are maintained at the watch station for reference during routine
operations and casualties. Engineering roving watch standers can also perform some corrective
and planned maintenance while on or off watch, and the bridge watch stander is often assigned
corrective and planned maintenance, as well as other administrative duties, when not on watch.
While the two LCS classes have different designs display styles, the overall concept – relying
heavily on automation controlled at an interface – is very similar.
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Figure 3. Photograph of LCS Bridge showing Human-Automation Interface equipment (IBS)
(Source: U. S. Navy)

3.4

LCS SURVEY DESIGN
The concept of operations for the LCS program relies on highly trained operators (often

spending 12-18 months in a “train to qualify” program) that may or may not have served on LCS
ships in the past. They use both bridge and engineering simulators for training as well as classroom
instruction with qualified and experienced trainers. A significant portion of planned and corrective
maintenance is performed by civilian operators, contracted for periods when the ship is in home
port. Shipboard control systems make extensive use of automation as part of the Navy's goal to
reduce shipboard manpower requirements. For this reason, the survey treated the LCS ship as an
environment, with three integrated sub systems (human and automation) operating the bridge,
engineering, and combat systems respectively. While there is little interaction between the three
subsystems, the degree of automation and interaction is similar for each. Although there are the
two variants of LCS, the Freedom and Independence class, the design and level of automation is

22

essentially the same between the two. To date, some LCSs have experienced significant failures
in mission accomplishment which have been attributable potentially to under staffing and over
scheduling the human component of the automation-human LCS operational environment. Initial
analysis of failure modes seems to indicate that the critical human components on the Littoral
Combat Ship are bridge and engine room staffing.
The design of this survey was to determine the extent to which the dimensions of fatigue,
maintenance tasking, watch tasking, and automation-human activity integration are perceived by
LCS bridge and engine room personnel to impact the performance of their duties. Survey results
were used to inform the design of automation-human cognitive task and activity workflow analyses
of LCS bridge and engine room activities. Results of the workflow analyses, in turn, were applied
to modify current LCS manpower models to optimize the integration of the automation-human
operational environment for each operational state: peace-time steaming, war-time steaming, and
combat operations.

Optimized LCS manpower models were programmed into the Naval

Postgraduate School’s IMPRINT discrete event modeling tool and simulated to verify automation
human operational performance.

For the survey, the following problem statement was

investigated:
What is the degree to which Littoral Combat Ship Class bridge and engine room
personnel perceive that they are impacted in their watch and maintenance
performance by understaffing and over scheduling the human component of the
automation-human LCS operational environment as measured by the dimensions
of fatigue, maintenance tasking, watch tasking, and human-automation activity
integration?
The survey was designed to measure four dimensions identified as potentially
contributing to failures of mission accomplishment. Each dimension was defined as follows:
a. Fatigue - state of human awareness as measured by the level of fatigue.
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b. Maintenance tasking - actual versus specified maintenance activities accomplishment.
c. Watch tasking - actual versus specified watch task accomplishment.
d. Automation-human activity integration - the extent to which littoral class ship automationhuman cognitive-task and activity workflows have been designed to minimize the potential
for operational errors.
This survey was focused on bridge and engineering personnel. The category “other”
includes Combat Information Center and other support personnel that alternated standing watch or
performing maintenance tasks. The survey opened with nine demographic questions directly
related to littoral class ship personnel performance of duties. Questions are listed below by number:
1. Primary group; E-7 or above, E-6 or below.
2. Location of primary duties; bridge, engineering spaces, other.
3. Number sea tours completed; first, second, third, fourth, five or more.
4. Primary ship types of past tours; amphibious, cruiser/destroyer, no previous sea tours.
5. LCS class variant; Freedom, Independence.
6. Last underway period, hours per day standing watch; do not stand watch, less than 2, 2 to
4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, more than 10.
7. Average hours/day of planned preventive maintenance; do not perform maintenance, less
than 2, 2 to 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, more than 10.
8. Average hours/day of corrective maintenance; do not perform maintenance, less than 2, 2
to 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, more than 10.
9. Last underway period, hours per day normally slept; less than 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10,
more than 10.
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The survey questions were formatted in a 7-unit Likert scale: 1. Extremely unlikely, 2. Moderately
unlikely, 3. Slightly unlikely, 4. Neither unlikely or likely, 5. Slightly likely, 6. Moderately likely,
7. Extremely likely.
Survey questions were originally presented in random order, as indicated by the question
number, but are grouped by measurement dimension for ease of reference:
Dimension: Fatigue
10.

How likely are you to sleep at the same time each day?

15.

What is the likelihood that you will be fatigued while standing watch?

16.

What is the likelihood that you will be fatigued while performing maintenance?

Dimension: Maintenance Tasking
11.

On an average day underway, what is the likelihood that you will have sufficient time to
perform assigned preventive maintenance?

12.

On an average day underway, what is the likelihood that you will have sufficient time to
perform assigned corrective maintenance?

Dimension: Watch Tasking Workload
14.

What is the likelihood that you will be able to perform all scheduled tasks on your watch
station?

17.

What is the likelihood that you will encounter more tasks than you have time to perform?

26.

What is the likelihood that you will be distracted by other tasks (i.e., planned or corrective
maintenance, administrative) while standing watch?

Dimension: Automation-Human Activity Integration
18.

What is the likelihood that you will clearly understand the difference between automated
functions and those you are expected to perform?
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19.

What is the likelihood that operating procedures are sufficiently detailed for you to operate
your equipment?

20.

What is the likelihood that the automated features of your watch station make standing watch
easier than on other ships?

22.

What is the chance that, when an automated alarm occurs, you trust that it is a real event?

23.

What is the likelihood that your watch station displays provide all the information you need
to stand watch?

24.

What is the chance that I will clearly understand all the information displayed on the control
panels for my watch station?

27.

What is the chance that modifications to the information display and automation could
mitigate effects of overtasking or fatigue at your watch station?
Questions 13, 21, and 25 were inserted to test internal consistency and are not listed above.

Questions 13 and 25 were randomly assigned as positive restatements of questions 11 and 15
respectively. Question 21 was randomly assigned as a negative restatement of question 20. The
results of the survey will be discussed in Chapter 4.

3.5

PERFORMANCE INTEGRATION DESIGN
Once the data was collected and analyzed from the LCS Crew Survey, the IMPRINT

modeling tool was used to build a model of the operational and maintenance tasking of a typical
watch section consisting of the Remote Console Operator (RCO) and the Engineering Plant
Technician (EPT). The watch period “mission” was populated with a set of operating and
maintenance procedures knows as “Functions” and the tasks associated with each function. These
tasks were then programmed into IMPRINT with the appropriate time, workflow “swim lanes” of
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manual, automatic, and cognizant functionality, and the model was run a number of times to
simulate different conditions in terms of workload, fatigue, and automation across the spectrum of
functions for the two operators. The next sections describe the project results including survey
results, construction of the IMPRINT model, and the tabular and graphical outcomes under various
conditions. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the results and recommendations made for
improvements to the model and for further research.
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CHAPTER 4
PROJECT RESULTS

4.1

LCS CREW SURVEY RESULTS.
The LCS Crew Survey was sponsored by the US Navy, and the survey design and

methodology were reviewed and approved by the Old Dominion University Batten College of
Engineering and Technology Internal Review Board. The survey was conducted in May-August
2017 and was open for a period of 3 months. E-mail invitations requesting participation were sent
to crews on two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) that had completed recent deployments. These two
ships provided a sample of approximately 80 personnel; The directed, non-random survey was
voluntary and was conducted using Qualtrics™ survey software. Participants remained
anonymous. There were 35 responses out of a population of 80, representing a response rate of 44
percent. Based on hypergeometric probabilities, this response rate yields a 90% confidence of
detecting a 5% difference and a 99% confidence of detecting a 10% difference in opinion on any
given question. This was considered sufficient, since the population is relatively homogeneous for
navy crew members of a single class of ship). (Pearson Education, Probability Distribution, 2010).
Respondents’ demographics were as follows.
•

18 (51%) were E-7 or above and 17 (49%) were E-6 or below.

•

10 (29%) primary duty location was on the bridge, 11 (31%) was in engineering spaces,
and 14 (40%) were in other personnel.

•

7 (20%) were on their first sea tour, 10 (29%) their second tour, 9 (26%) their third
tour, 3 (8%) their fourth tour, and 6 (17%) on their fifth or greater tour.

•

9 (26%) had prior tours on an amphibious ship, 20 (57%) on a cruiser/destroyer, and 6
(17%) no prior tours.
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•

27 (77%) served on the LCS Freedom class and 8 (23%) on the LCS Independence
class.

•

4 (11%) did not stand watch, 2 (6%) stood watch 4 to 6 hours, 2 (6%) stood watch 6 to
8 hours, 16 (46%) 8 to 10 hours, and 11 (31%) 10 or more hours.

•

8 (23%) did not perform preventive maintenance, 6 (17%) less than 2 hours/day
performing preventive maintenance, 11 (31%) 2 to 4 hours/day, 4 (12%) 4 to 6
hours/day, and 6 (17%) 6 to 8 hours/day.

•

10 (28%) did not perform corrective maintenance, 8 (23%) less than 2 hours/day
performing preventive maintenance, 8 (23%) 2 to 4 hours/day, 8 (23%) 4 to 6
hours/day, and 1 (3%) 6 to 8 hours/day.

•

4 (11%) slept less than 4 hours/day, 24 (69%) 4 to 6 hours/day, 5 (14%) 6 to 8
hours/day, 2 (6%) 8 to 10 hours/day.

Kendall’s tau was estimated to test internal consistency between positive questions 11
and 13 and questions 15 and 25 and between negative questions 20 and 21. Table 2 reports
Kendall’s tau and corresponding p-values. Overall, the tau signs and p-values support internal
consistency.

Questions

Relationship tau

p-value

11 – 13

Positive

+0.794

2.22e-16

15 – 25

Positive

+0.772

3.58e-07

20 - 21

Negative

-0.375

0.0067

Table 2. Internal consistency Kendall’s tau statistics.
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Exploratory analysis was used to examine the survey response data in each dimension for
trends and anomalies in the LCS automation-human operational environment that may have to be
considered in the subsequent design of the cognitive-task-automation workflow analysis. Three
delimitations apply to this statistical analysis: (1) While the survey size was relatively small
relative to pure research surveys, the survey purpose was only to assess potential automation,
human, and environmental variables contributing to observed LCS failures. (2) The use of the
SCREE plot, Kendall’s tau analyses, and Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis were used as
supporting analyses of potential variables contributing to observed LCS failures. (3) While it may
have been appropriate to collapse the results into smaller anchored bins if the survey had been
designed as a primary research measurement instrument, the 7-node Likert Scale was preserved to
more clearly show the fidelity of the answers. For this survey, exploratory analysis was performed
within each measurement dimension:
Dimension: Fatigue. This section focused on the respondents’ perception of sleep and
fatigue, and their impact on watch standing and maintenance. The responses to question 10,
likelihood of sleeping at the same time each day, resulted in a bi-modal distribution. Thirty-four
percent (34%) reported that it was unlikely, with the mode at 14% moderately likely, and fortynine percent (49%) likely, with the mode at 34% moderately likely. The question then arose as to
whether this bi-modal distribution was related to primary duty station. Table 5 indicates that a
relationship exists between the likelihood of sleeping the same time each and primary duty station.
Bridge and Other personnel displayed bimodal distributions with 8 bridge personnel responding
unlikely and 2 likely and 7 other personnel responding unlikely, 1 neither, and 6 likely.
Engineering personnel tended more strongly toward unlikely with 9 responding unlikely, 1 neither,
and 1 slightly likely. Table 3 shows fatigue responses.
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bdg

3

2

3

0

1

1

0

Eng

5

2

2

1

1

0

0

Oth

5

1

1

1

1

4

1

Score*

Table 3. Count of sleep-same-time to primary duty station.
*Likert Scale Score where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = Very Likely

Responses to question 15 indicated that ninety-two percent (92%) of respondents were
likely to be fatigued while on watch with seventy-seven percent (77%) percent reporting
moderately or extremely likely. Similarly, responses to question 16 indicated that seventy-one
percent (71%) of respondents were likely to be fatigued while performing maintenance with fiftyseven percent (57%) reporting moderately or extremely likely. Of note, none (0%) of the
respondents chose “Moderately Unlikely or “Extremely Unlikely” in either of these categories.
This result tends to suggest that fatigue is considered a significant factor in both activities, and
merits further research. For the discussion of determination of outliers, reference section Multiple
Joint Correspondence Analysis.
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Figure 4. Fatigue Response Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = Very
Likely; Outliers – no fill.)

Dimension: Watch Tasking Workload.

This section focused on the respondents’

perception of the potential for “overtasking” as it related to the time available to complete assigned
tasks. Question 14 measured watch tasking workload balancing. Here respondents formed either
a bi-modal distribution. Eighty-three percent (83%) reported neither or likely ability to perform
all scheduled tasks at their watch station. Of the 17% reporting unlikely to perform all scheduled
tasks, four were in Engineering, and two in the Other category. Question 17 was designed to
determine the sufficiency of watch tasking workload design. Eighty-three percent (83%) reported
that it was likely that they encountered more tasks than they had time to perform with sixty-eight
percent (68%) reporting that encountering unplanned task was moderately or extremely likely. Of
the 83% reporting likely, twenty percent (20%) were bridge personnel and 31.5% each were
Engineering and Other personnel. Question 26, distraction by other tasks, was designed to assess
the randomness of unplanned task arrivals versus the ability of personnel to control when they
could respond to unplanned tasks. The response distribution was negatively skewed with seventy-
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four percent (74%) of respondents reporting that it was likely that unplanned tasks were a
distraction. Of the 74% reporting likely, thirty-one percent (31%) were Other personnel, twentynine percent (29%) were Engineering personnel, and fourteen percent (14%) were Bridge
personnel. Responses to questions 17 and 26 suggest that personnel feel overtasked in both watch
and maintenance. Figure 5 graphically summarizes these results.

Figure 5. Watch tasking Response Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 =
Very Likely; Outliers – no fill)

Dimension: Maintenance Tasking. This section examined the respondents’ perception of
their ability to perform both assigned corrective and preventive maintenance tasks.

The

distributions for both questions 11 and 12 were negatively skewed with respective modes at
response 5 for question 11, preventive maintenance tasks, and 4, corrective maintenance tasks.
For question 11, preventive maintenance tasks, forty-six percent (46%) responded that it was likely
that they had sufficient time to complete preventive maintenance tasks, but a substantial minority
of thirty-four percent (34%) responded that it was unlikely.

For question 12, corrective
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maintenance tasks, forty-three percent (43%) responded that it was likely that they had sufficient
time to complete corrective maintenance tasks, but, again, a substantial minority of twenty-six
percent (26%) responded that it was unlikely. For question 11, the likely-unlikely combinations
were Bridge 14% - 6%, Engineering 14% - 14%, and Other 17% - 11%. For question 12, the likelyunlikely combinations were Bridge 11% - 6%, Engineering 14% - 14%, and Other 20% - 6%.
Combining these response rates with those of Watch tasking questions 17 and 26 suggests that
planned preventive and corrective maintenance tasks are not level loaded across watches and that
personnel have to deal with unplanned tasks on an overload basis.

Figure 6 summarizes

maintenance task responses.

Figure 6. Maintenance Response Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 =
Very Likely; Outliers – no fill)

Dimension: Automation-Human Integration. This area explored the impact of automation and
human integration as it relates to the watch station. Questions 18, 19, and 20 sought to measure
the effectiveness of the automation-human workflow design. As shown in Figure 7, eighty-six

34

percent (86%) responded that it was likely that they clearly understood the difference between
automated functions and those they are expected to perform. The responses to question 19,
operating procedures are sufficiently detailed for you to operate your equipment, resulted in a
bimodal distribution. Seventy-one percent (71%) responded that operating procedures were
sufficient, but twenty-six percent (26%) responded that procedures were not sufficient. Table 4
indicates that engineering and other personnel were more likely to respond that operating
procedures were sufficient, but Bridge personnel were more evenly divided on procedures
sufficiency. Responses to question 20, automated features make standing watch easier, resulted in
a negatively skewed distribution with forty-five percent (45%) responding likely and thirty-four
percent (34%) responding unlikely. Table 5 indicates that bridge personnel tended to view
automation assistance more positively than engineering personnel and other personnel.

Station

Unlikely

Likely

Bridge

11% (4/35)

17% (6/35)

Engineering

6% (2/35)

26% (9/35)

Other

9% (3/35)

28% (10/35)

Totals

26% (9/35)

71% (25/35)

Table 4. Relationship procedures sufficiency.

Station
Bridge

Unlikely

Likely

9% (3/35)

17% (6/35)

Engineering

11% (4/35)

14% (5/35)

Other

14% (5/35)

14% (5/35)

Totals

34% (12/35)

45% (16/35)

Table 5. Relationship automation to watch ease.
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Figure 7. Q18, 19, 20; Human-Automation Distributions. (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely
and 7 = Very Likely; Outliers – no fill)

Questions 22, 23, 24, and 27 sought to measure the effectiveness of automation-human
information exchange and comprehension. As shown in Figure 8, question 22, trust in automation
alarms, resulted in a bimodal distribution with forty-three percent (43%) responding they were
likely to trust automation alarms and forty-six percent (46%) responding that they were unlikely
to trust automation alarms. Questions 23, 24, and 27 resulted in predominantly likely responses.
Question 23, your watch station displays provide all necessary information, resulted in seventyone percent (71%) likely and twenty percent (20%) unlikely responses. Of the unlikely responses,
two were bridge personnel, one was engineering, and four were other personnel. Question 24,
chance that I will clearly understand all display information, resulted in seventy-four percent
(74%) responding that they were likely and eleven percent (11%) responding that they were
unlikely to understand. Of the unlikely responses, one each was bridge and engineering personnel,
and two were other personnel. Question 27, chance that modifications to the information display
and automation could mitigate effects of overtasking or fatigue, resulted in a negatively skewed
distribution with sixty-six percent (66%) responding likely and fourteen percent (14%) unlikely.
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Of the unlikely responses, one was from the bridge and two each were engineering and other
personnel.

Figure 8. Q22, 23, 24, 27 Human-Automation Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very
Unlikely and 7 = Very Likely; Outliers – no fill).

Multivariate Joint Correspondence Analysis (MJCA). Multivariate Joint Correspondence
Analysis (MJCA) is a method of determining whether a survey’s responses demonstrate
homogeneity or heterogeneity. Survey frequency responses are plotted in a unit-normalized, Chi-
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square distance cloud of points which is then analyzed in the geometric space to partition the
survey information into cluster centers of mass, noise, and outliers, which are the structural
information in the geometry. Analysis of the LCS survey data using the R statistical application
“ca” showed that the first four dimensions were responsible for 49.0% of the cumulative principle
inertia (eigenvalues), with the fifth dimension raising the cumulative inertia to 54.8% (Table 8).
Camiz and Gomes (2015) note that only the eigenvalues larger than the “trivial average ½“ are
interpreted as significant. Thus, multivariate correspondence analysis was limited to the mapping
of the survey dimensions to the first four principal component dimensions.

Cum

Scree

Dimension

Inertia

Percent Percent Plot

1

0.179731 18.3

18.3

******

2

0.156112 15.9

34.1

*****

3

0.086036 8.7

42.9

***

4

0.060173 6.1

49.0

**

5

0.056722 5.8

54.8

**

Table 6. SCREE Plot of First 4 Dimensions from LCS Survey

Dimension 2 Versus 1 Analysis
The biplot in Figure 9 of the full survey response data on dimension 2 versus dimension 1
coordinates with a bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse yield a coefficient of correlation of 0.00914 and show that the mass of the data is identically, independently distributed (IID). The
data within the 95% confidence interval do not clearly map to either dimension 1 or 2. This
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Figure 9. LCS Survey, Full – Dim 2 v 1.

observation along with the observation that dimension 1 explains 18.3% of the variation and
dimension 2 an additional 15.9% (cumulatively 34.1%) leads to the conclusion that there is no
structural information in the IID data. Examination of the biplot indicates that the survey responses
partitioned into three clouds, the IID data plus two outlier clouds. Table 7 reports the mass, quality,
inertia, coordinates, and contributions of the data in outlier cloud in the lower right corner of the
biplot, and Table 8 reports those of the outlier cloud in the lower left corner.
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name mass qlt

inr

cor1

ctr

15-4

6

687

16

935

282 405
1122

18-4

6

689

17

778

19-4

2

572

11

956

23-4

6

689

17

778

178 511
1318
172 400
1457
178 511
1318

24-4

8

655

17

272

31

cor2

ctr

625
1231

Table 7. Full – Dim 2 v 1 Lower Right Outlier Cloud

Question 15 asked “… likelihood that you will be fatigued while standing watch …,” and the
response 4 was “neither.” Examination of the Figure 1 “Fatigue – Q15WFag” frequency plot and
Table 6 indicates that a response of 4 was low mass and medium quality whose inertia is due
primarily to it large coordinate distances. Thus, response 4, shown with no fill color, should be
considered as not belonging to the mass of the response 5 – 7. The interpretation is that fatigue is
an important predictor of watch performance. Similar analysis of question 18, “… likelihood
that you will clearly understand the difference between automated functions and those you are
expected to perform …,” shows that response 4 does not belong to the mass of response 5 – 7,
which further supports that LCS personnel understand the difference. Analysis of question 19,
“… likelihood that operating procedures are sufficiently detailed …,” question 23, “… likelihood
that your watch station displays provide all the information you need …,” and question 24, “…
clearly understand all the information displayed …,” yield the same conclusion. The 4 Neither
response does not belong to the mass of either the unlikely or likely subgroups. Responses to
questions 19 and 23 should be considered as two separate subgroups, and the 9 and 7 unlikely
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number of responses indicate some procedures may not be sufficiently detailed to provide all the
information needed to stand watch. Of the personnel responding unlikely to question 19, 4 were
bridge personnel, 2 engineering, and 3 “other”. Of personnel responding unlikely to question 23,
2 were bridge personnel, 1 engineering, and 4 other personnel. Responses to question 24 should
be considered as supporting LCS personnel understanding of display information.

name mass qlt

inr

cor1

ctr

cor2 ctr

10-4

12

-

531

-

4

668

1324
11-1
12-1
18-1
18-2

6
4
4
2

758
612
503
396

16

-

14

1386
-

15

1278
-

12

1177
1246

137

673
608

-

151

428

690
-

184

246

838
-

167

246

828
-

150

971

Table 8. Full – Dim 2 v 1 Lower Left Outlier Cloud

Question 10, “… How likely are you to sleep at the same time each day …,” response 4
exhibited the same low mass and medium quality with its inertia due primarily to its large
coordinate distances. The two neither responses do not belong to either the unlikely or likely
subgroups. As with questions 19 and 23, the responses to question 10 should be considered as from
two separate subgroups. Of those responding unlikely to question 10, 8 were bridge personnel, 9
were engineering, and 7 were Other. Of those responding likely, 2 were bridge personnel, 1 was
engineering, and 6 were other personnel. Questions 11 and 12 response 1 and question 18
responses 1 and 2 exhibit similar low mass and medium quality with their respective inertia due
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primarily to large coordinate distances. Questions 11, having “… sufficient time to perform
assigned preventive maintenance …” and 12, having “… sufficient time to perform corrective
maintenance …” both response 1 each indicate that the extremely unlikely responses are outliers
not belonging the population mass in Figure 6.
Dimension 3 Versus 2 Analysis
Figure 10 presents the biplot of the full survey response data on dimension 3 versus
dimension 2 coordinates, again with a bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse. The coefficient
of correlation between the response frequencies was -0.09505. Like dimension 2 versus dimension
1, the mass of the data is normally IID with some outliers and do not clearly map to either
dimension 2 or 3. Dimension 3 adds only 8.7% explanation of the variation (cumulatively 42.9%).
Again, this leads to the conclusion that there is no structural information in the IID data of the first
three dimensions. Question 17 with response 2, questions 18 and 24 with response 1, question 20
with response 7, and question 27 with response 3 form one set of outliers near the bottom of the
confidence ellipse. From Figure 2, Question 17, “… likelihood that you will encounter more tasks
than you have time to perform,” the three unlikely responses 2 were clearly not members of the
dominant likely population. It is noteworthy that all response 2’s were bridge personnel. From
Figure 4, Question 18, “… understand the difference between automated functions and those you
are expected to perform,” and from Figure 5 Question 24, “… clearly understand all the
information displayed on the control panels for my watch station,” response 1’s do not belong to
the negatively skewed distributions. The one response 3 for Question 24 is not statistically
different from the negatively skewed distribution. The two responses 1 for Question 18 were other
personnel, and the three responses 1 for Question 24 were one bridge personnel and two other
personnel. From Figure 4, the one response 7 for Question 20, “…automated features of your
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watch station make standing watch easier…,” does not belong to the 1-6 response distribution.
The 7 response was a bridge personnel. From Figure 5, the one response 3 to Question 27,
“…chance that modifications to the information display and automation could mitigate effects of
overtasking or fatigue…,” does not belong with the 1-2 or the 4-7 responses and was from a bridge
personnel. The other three outlier response 4’s in the upper left quadrant of Figure 4 were Question
18, Question 19, “…operating procedures are sufficiently detailed…,” and Question 23, “… watch
station displays provide all the information you need….” This indicates that the responses for
these questions are bimodal with the 4 responses not belonging to either mode. The three 4
responses for Question 18 were one bridge and two other personnel. For question 19, it was one
other personnel, and, for question 23, it was one bridge and two other personnel.

Figure 10. LCS Survey, Full – Dim 3 v 2
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Dimension 4 Versus 3 Analysis
Figure 11 presents the biplot of the full survey response data on dimension 4 versus
dimension 3 coordinates, again with a bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse. The coefficient
of correlation between the response frequencies was -0.07381. Like the prior dimensions, the
mass of the data is normally IID and do not clearly map to either dimension 3 or 4.
4 adds only

Dimension

6.1% explanation of the variation (cumulatively 49.0%). Again, this leads to the

conclusion that there is no structural information in the IID data of the first four dimensions.
Examination of the biplot indicates that the survey responses are now distributed about the
confidence ellipse rather than being partitioned into distinct clouds. Outlier responses to questions
17 response 1, 18 responses 1 and 2, 20 response 7, and 24 response 1 were identified and discussed
for prior biplots.

Questions 11 and 12, “…sufficient time to perform assigned preventive

(corrective) maintenance…” response 7’s do not belong to the negatively skewed distributions in
Figure 6. Likewise, question 16, “… be fatigued while performing maintenance …,” response 3
does not belong to the 4-7 likely response distribution of Figure 4.
Demographics
Figure 12 presents the biplot of full survey demographics data on dimension 2 versus 1
coordinate, with the bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse for only the demographics. There
are two outliers. Last underway period, hours per day normally slept, Q9_HrsSleepL6_8, for
normally sleeping 6 to 8 hours per day, maps primarily to the Dimension 2 negative axis. This
demographic data point is most closely associated with the Figure 9, dimension 2 versus 1, outlier
cloud responses fatigued 15-4, understanding automated functions 18-4, detailed operating
procedures 19-4, and watch station information 23-4, which suggests an association between 6 to
8 hours sleep daily to being optimally alert while standing watch.
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Figure 11. LCS Survey, Full – Dim 4 v 3.

The outlier for number sea tours completed, Q3_ToursFourth, maps primarily to the
negative dimension 1 axis. Again, this demographic is most closely associated with the Figure 6,
dimension 2 versus 1, outlier cloud responses sleep time 10-4, preventive maintenance time 11-1,
corrective maintenance time, and understanding automated functions 18-1 and 18-2.

This

association may be due to the low mass of the 3 personnel (8%) responding that this was their
fourth tour. Conversely, 6 personnel (17%) responded that they were on their fifth or greater tour.
This conflicting evidence does not allow any conclusion regarding an association between prior
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sea duty experience and transition training before being assigned sea duty on a highly automated
vessel such as an LCS.

Figure 12. LCS Demographics – Dim 2 v 1.

Figure 13 presents the biplot of demographics data on dimension 3 versus 2 coordinates
with the bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse for only the demographics. Again, only
responses Q9_HrsSleepL6_8 and Q3_ToursFourth displayed as outliers. Figure 13 presents the
biplot of demographics data on dimension 4 versus 3 coordinates with the bivariate normal 95%
confidence ellipse for only the demographics. One additional demographic outlier for last
underway period, hours per day normally slept, Q9_HrsSleep4-, for normally sleeping less than
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four hours per day, maps primarily to the Dimension 4 negative axis. There are no response
outliers in the lower right quadrant of Figure 8, Dimension 4 versus 3, with which this demographic
outlier maps.

Figure 13. LCS Demographics – Dim 3 v 2

Survey Discussion
The goal of the survey was to determine if, in the opinion of experienced LCS
crewmembers, there is a perception that their ability to perform their watch standing and
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maintenance duties is impacted by the highly automated LCS environment. Integration of
response frequency histograms and multiple joint correspondence analysis partitioning of
responses into cluster centers of mass, noise, and outliers revealed response patterns that support
the conclusion that the LCS automation environment does impact performance of watch standing
and maintenance duties. Analysis of the demographics (Supervisory Duties, Primary Duty, and
Experience) support that survey results were consistent across all three variables, with one outlier
being those with four tours, which is not unexpected given the Navy’s sea shore rotation of 3-5
years – someone in this category would be very senior, and not many personnel at this level are
assigned to a single ship.

Question 9 (Hours of Sleep) seemed very concentrated for all

demographics between 4 and 6 hours (69%), which is not surprising given that most of the
individuals surveyed stand the same watch schedule. This amount of sleep reported by the
respondents is significantly below that recommended in Navy Policy (7 hours) and is consistent
with the results of the Fatigue section of the survey; it stands to reason that there is a relationship
between low hours of sleep, not sleeping at the same time (lack of a circadian rhythm) and
operators being fatigued while performing maintenance and standing watch.
Returning to Figure 4, Fatigue Response Distributions, responses to question 10,
likelihood of sleeping at the same time each day, partition into two groups, seventy-seven
percent (77%) are unlikely to do so. and twenty-six percent (26%) likely to do so. This sleep
pattern is negatively associated with the responses to question 15 likely of being fatigued while
standing watch and question 16 likely of being fatigued while performing maintenance tasks.
Returning to Figure 5, Watch tasking Response Distributions, only the three response 3’s
were outliers for question 17, strengthening support for the perception of encountering more
tasks than having time to perform. The likely responses to question 14, performing all scheduled
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tasks, and question 26, being distracted by other tasks, suggests that LCS personnel prioritize
accomplishment of assigned tasks and response to other unplanned tasks as they can. This may or
may not be the best prioritization plan given the criticality and potential impact of other unplanned
events.

The distribution of responses to having sufficient time to perform preventive and

corrective maintenance tasks in Figure 3 are negatively skewed with adjusted 35% unlikely and
44% likely for preventive maintenance tasks and 21% unlikely and 42% likely for corrective
maintenance tasks. Again, as with watch tasking, there may be unplanned tasks impacting some
engineering personnel’s ability to complete maintenance tasks. Evaluation of the automationrelated question 20 indicated that a slight majority of respondents, 44%, seem to feel that the
automation on LCS made their watch standing easier than on other ships, but 35% responded that
automation made watch standing more difficult.

After omitting outliers for question 18,

understanding the difference between automated and manual functions, all responses were likely.
After omitting the outlier for question 19, sufficiently detailed operating procedures, responses
partitioned into two groups; 26% unlikely and 74% likely.
Returning to Figure 8, question 22, trusting automated alarms, resulted in a relatively
uniform response rate with 49% responding unlikely and 40% responding likely. After adjustment
for the three outliers, question 23, workstation displays supply sufficient information, the
responses partitioned into two subgroups with 22% responding unlikely and 78% responding
likely.
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Figure 14. LCS Demographics – Dim 4 v 3

Closer evaluation of the automation-related questions indicated that a slight majority of
respondents (54 percent) seem to feel that the automation on LCS made their watch “more
challenging” than on other ships (question 21). Conversely, the distribution for a similar question
(20) was much closer to a standard bell curve, about the same majority responding that the
automation made their watch “easier” than on other ships. The responses to these questions did
show a bit of a dichotomy in that while the answers to the more positive questions (18, 19 and 20)
were skewed heavily toward the “likely” side, the more negative question (21) was also skewed
toward the “likely” direction. Questions 24, clearly understanding display information, and 27,
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display modification could mitigate overtasking and fatigue, provide insight into the LCS
automation-human interface design. An adjusted 96% responded likely to question 24 that they
understood display information. Conversely, 68% responded likely to question 27 and 12%
responded unlikely indicating a small proportion of LCA personnel find that display information
contributes to overtasking and fatigue. Given that the demographic biplots (Figure 14 is the final
one, included for continuity) were statistically homogeneous but multiple outliers were observed
in the response biplots, it can be concluded that the design of and training for the LCS automationhuman operational environment assumes a standard Navy personnel profile and does not account
for natural differences in human capabilities. This strongly suggests a need to revise the design of
the human component in the manning model of the LCS environment to identify and integrate
management of failure risk due to variance in natural human capabilities.

4.2

PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION
Workflow Analysis: Workflow analysis is a process in which businesses examine the

progression of workflows to improve efficiency. Workflow analysis identifies areas for
improvement; for example, by improving workflows, resources are used more efficiently, and staff
is better able to work to capacity.

There are myriad techniques and software programs for

workflow analysis, including IMPRINT, but most have a rather deterministic approach (as seen
earlier in the HTA section of this paper). Some researchers have maintained that in looking at
systems that may include a high degree of automation, as well as human-automation interfaces, a
cognitive element is required. As noted by Karwowski and Ward (P.513): “Work measurement
models must be based on both work and job design in addition to a paradigm of human
performance” and that “a systematic description of human performance covers a wide range of
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work situations, from routine performance to stressful encounters with accidental events, is
needed” (Karwowski and Ward, 2016).
Using the approach above, the set of critical selected for analysis, are broken down into
task elements with a matrix to capture both the task and the applicable “swim lane” using a task
analysis worksheet, which categorizes the elements of each step as follows:
a. Physical Elements: Those elements which are dependent upon human sensing (i.e.,
auditory, tactile, etc.)
b. Cognitive Elements: Those elements that depend on human thinking and decision
making (i.e., weigh alternatives, make decision)
c. Automation Elements: Those elements associated with automated functions (i.e.,
display status, calculate function.
The task analysis worksheet in Figure 15 displays all the elements and is an example of a completed
form for one of the operational tasks:
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Figure 15: Sample Time-Motion Analysis Worksheet

A similar Time-Motion Analysis Worksheet was prepared for each of the nine “critical tasks” as
part of the proof of concept. These are included as Appendix G.
Failure Mode Analysis: Once the high-risk procedures had been identified and broken
down into discrete tasks for workflow analysis, a FMEA risk analysis (Figure 16) was performed
to identify potential failure modes, occurrence distributions, and impacts. This allowed for the
generation of a failure action plan (FAP) for each failure mode (human or automation) using
standard Failure Mode Analysis techniques. To support this process, the author developed a
tailored worksheet (Figure 17) to capture the critical failure tasks identified in the Time-Motion
Analysis Worksheet, determine the degree of risk by applying a 1-10 scale to the Severity (SEV),
Frequency of Occurrence (OCC) and Detectability (DET), resulting in a final Risk Process

53

Number (RPN) that can then be used to determine the tasks within each procedure that present the
highest risk of impacting mission (including severe injury/death and major equipment damage).
Once steps are identified, recommended actions can be hypothesized to reduce the risk, by
addressing one of the three factors (SEV, OCC, or DET) that will result in a lower RPN if
implemented.

Figure 16: Failure Analysis Worksheet (Page 1 of 2)

The spreadsheet above can be filled in for each task to by analyzed using the below key, modified
from a standard FMEA spreadsheet which was slightly tailored to address the Navy-specific
parameters that would apply to normal at-sea operations based on operator experience. While
there could be other interpretations of the gradients, the below table is used for consistency and
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conforms to the norms used in Navy Operational Risk Analysis processes (OPNAVINST
3500.39C, July 2010).

Figure 17: Failure Analysis Worksheet Key (Page 2 of 2)

From the Time Motion Analysis Worksheets prepared for each critical task, a FEMA
worksheet was prepared to address the critical failure modes, causes, and recommended solutions
from each one, and the resulting (potential) improvement in risk were these recommendations to
be implemented. When the tasks are plugged into IMPRINT, an attempt will be made to insert
these mitigations and compare mission performance results before and after to see if performance
improvements or degradations can be noted. In addition, the IMPRINT models can be used to
identify areas of overloading, issues with the human-automation interface, and at varying levels of
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fatigue for comparison. A discussion of the “Reports” function of IMPRINT and example results
from this analysis are presented in the following section.

4.3

IMPRINT FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE MODELING
The current models used to model shipboard manning are based on calculations of gross

workload, such as watch, maintenance, training, etc. but do not provide a level of detail that allows
any type of workload analysis or modeling of anticipated working conditions such as fatigue,
overtasking, or the effects of automation. The use of modeling software for The IMPRINT
program was developed by the Army as a means to model workload in individuals and teams and
is ideally suited for military crews since they often work in small teams, even if they are a subset
of a larger force. The Navy could easily adapt the IMPRINT model for shipboard manning, adding
a layer of fidelity to the model that has not been possible and allowing manpower planners to
assess risk to mission and impact of external factors to the process, allowing for better informed
decisions.
IMPRINT is a software program based on the C# code protocols, and allows for a series of
models by Force, Operators, and Maintainers, as well as Support Personnel. It can be used to
construct a series of missions, functions, and tasks, and is also capable of identifying operations
and tasks performed by humans as well as by machines, or automation. Once the basic tasks are
constructed into a network “function”, the individual tasks can be simulated using a series of
defined parameters, including time, accuracy, and assigned parameters for degree of difficulty in
areas including auditory, visual, cognitive, etc. Once the operators are built, and the mission
defined as a network, specific taxons can be added to simulate fatigue, levels of training and
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experience, and other “human” variables that can influence the outcome. A sample network
display (in this case, an Army tank mission) is shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Sample IMPRINT Workflow Diagram (Function Level).

The settings (time requirements, accuracy criterion, shown in the upper right corner) are
based on either experience and/or information about the specific system, educated assumptions, or
a distribution of a type selected by the analysist. The mission can then be run in real time and
compared against specific desired or acceptable outcomes, such as acceptable failure rate or a
specific outcome. This information is supplied to the operator as a table and/or graph and can be
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compared to various outcomes as parameters are varied based on experience. In practice, this
method has been utilized by the United States Army to simulate the crew of an Abrams M1A1
tank and support manning decisions for future consideration.
IMPRINT can also be used in conjunction with other software simulations such as Fatigue
Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST), a model used to predict operator effectiveness based on sleep
and work schedules. The assumption inherent in this paper is that IMPRINT, combined with FAST
and informed by in-situ measurements and surveys of crew members will validate its potential as
a planning tool in determining future manpower requirements for Navy ships. A schematic of this
process is shown in Figure 19, and a FAST graph is shown in Figure 20.

Figure 19. SAFTE Simulation Model (IMPRINT User’s Guide, 2007, pg. 3, Reproduced with
permission)
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Figure 20: FAST Software Graph of Predicted Effectiveness (Source: Naval Postgraduate School
Crew Endurance Handbook, 2017, Pg. 3)

IMPRINT has been used in small crew situations, for example a 4-person Tank crew, to
determine the feasibility of combining workload tasks and reducing the number of operators. In
one case, predicted failure rates of the proposed manpower reductions were sufficient to inform
the decisionmakers and influence the outcome of a tank crew manning study (Allender, 2014).

4.4

IMPRINT PERFORMANCE DESIGN
The Naval Postgraduate School has created a detailed model of the LCS FREEDOM class

crew using the Forces Model in IMPRINT, which forms the basis for this study. In conducting
initial research for this study, it was apparent that the predominance of mechanical failures in the
program have been in the engineering department, for this reason this study focuses on a small
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team of individuals who stand watch and maintain equipment in the Engineering Department,
using a watch and work schedule designed around the Standard Navy Work Week (now called the
Naval Allowance Factor). This reference gives a notional breakdown of each major element of a
workday. For this analysis, key portions of the day were defined as a “mission” and various
“functions” assigned to the crew members during these periods. As previously noted, the
Operations Model of IMPRINT allows a detailed analysis of specific functions and tasks as they
relate to cognitive function and performance. A schematic of the NAF is shown Figure 21.

Figure 21: Standard Navy Work Week (after OPNAVINST 1000.16L, NAVY TOTAL FORCE
MANPOWER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, June 2014)

60

Numerous studies have shown that the actual hours worked and slept vary somewhat for
the crew members in actual ships at sea, and these empirical numbers could easily be used in
future studies to determine impact of manning shortfalls, excessive workload, or reduced
effectiveness of automation. For the purpose of standardization for comparison, and since there
are multiple initiatives underway to better align manning and workload to the design parameters,
this study used the Navy standard as the baseline.
LCS Study Impact. Based on the aforementioned survey of two LCS crews discussed in
section 1 of this chapter, the following conclusion applies:
“The four dimensions of human cognizance, task workload, maintenance, and
automation-human integration are important for consideration in refining the
IMPRINT model in the next phase of this research. Specifically, a majority of those
surveyed feel that fatigue, overtasking, and the degree of automation inherent in
the current manning model for LCS present significant challenges. This leads to
the conclusion that these areas merit further detailed research cognitive/physical
task workflow analysis, refinements to the existing IMPRINT modeling algorithms,
and possible modifications to the overall manning construct to address identified
potential deficiencies. Additionally, an examination of specific areas of automation
and the human system interface may be appropriate. Based on the survey results,
the researchers performed cognitive/physical task workflow analysis of bridge and
engineering tasks, as well as examining past failures, and build an initial IMPRINT
crew model that accounts for the four survey dimensions in the next stage of
research.”
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The IMPRINT program has embedded algorithms to apply some of these factors, but as
limitations are encountered, some recommendations for modification may follow. The following
breakdown addresses the domains addressed in the workflow analysis.
Watch: There are several required functions on a ship that are performed around the clock
by a specifically qualified individual called a “watch stander”. In order to perform these functions,
an individual must be “on watch” for a given period. Since the Navy manning model uses a 3section rotation underway as a baseline for manning calculations, this was used as the basis for the
breakdown of hours in this study as well. An individual on watch has a relatively discrete list of
duties during this period, consisting of monitoring equipment parameters, patrolling the workspace
(in this case, the engine room), starting, stopping, and operating various pieces of equipment, and
responding to casualties. IMPRINT allows the analyst to build a set of Functions based on these
duties, each with a discrete set of tasks to accomplish that function. For a watch stander, the basic
reference for most activities is called Engineering Operating System (EOSS), which consists of a
series of operating procedures in relatively discrete activities and a set of defined tasks. These are
sorted by type, either by Operating Procedure or Casualty Procedure. There are hundreds of
individual procedures, and it would be possible to model each one of them in IMPRINT, but since
a given operator is unlikely to perform more than a few per watch period, a reasonable model can
be developed, based on experience, to simulate a notional watch period with a defined set of
functions. The specific operating and casualty EOSS procedures chosen for the model was defined
later in the paper and explained in detail. Overall, the combination of a sequence of operations
can simulate a “normal” watch period, and casualty procedures can be inserted into the model to
determine their impact on the crew members both individually and as a team. For example, a
single individual may be able to perform a sequence of normal operating procedures by himself
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over a watch, but he may have to give and receive reports to other members of the watch team or
coordinate some actions with them or with personnel outside the watch team. He may also have
to use automated functions to complete some tasks that support a particular function. If a casualty
occurs, the watch stander may have to leave his station or turn his attention to the casualty, and
another crew member may have to take over the responsibilities of the normal watch. This could,
in turn, impact that individual’s ability to perform other tasks, depending on where he or she was
in the workday – maintenance left unaccomplished, loss of sleep resulting in fatigue, etc. could
result in other impacts in that individual’s model. The casualty could also result in a loss of certain
equipment or loss of automation, making subsequent watches more complex and perhaps
increasing the probability of other failures. IMPRINT has the ability to model each of these
situations, but in order to validate the model, some assumptions must be made to build a
“reasonable” set of parameters to simulate one set of situations, and a determination must be made
as the value of building multiple scenarios versus the time and effort/cost involved. A sample
“Function” is modeled Figure 22 as an example (detailed IMPRINT protocols used in this model
are described in Appendix F).
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Figure 22. IMPRINT Workflow Example (Task Level)

Maintenance: The Navy recognizes two distinct types of maintenance, Planned and
Corrective. Planned maintenance is based on several historical models, including expected failure
rates and modes, mean time between failure, degree of automation in monitoring, and other
engineering factors. It is built around a series of Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRC)
performed on a specific piece of equipment at a specified periodicity. The majority of these
procedures area relatively short in duration (0.5-3 hours) and while most are performed by a single
operator, some require multiple personnel for part of the task or to act a safety observer. Each
MRC includes discrete sections for safety precautions, tools and materials, notes and warnings,
and a step-by-step procedure. The experience level and type of individual (called “rating”) is
designated on each MRC, as is the amount of time expected to perform the maintenance in
increments of 0.1 hr. There are various categories of MRCs, including periodic (performed per a
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calendar schedule, such as daily, weekly, monthly, annual, etc.); Situational (performed when a
specific event occurs, such as getting underway, shooting a gun, etc.) and Unscheduled (performed
when a minor discrepancy is discovered and can be repaired on the spot in a short amount of time).
Other types exist in the maintenance deck, but they occur either with limited frequency or are
associated with long in port periods and are thus unlikely to be performed during underway periods
used for this analysis. To determine a realistic set of MRC “functions” to be performed as subsets
of this mission, historical data was examined by experienced operators and maintainers and a
reasonable set of MRCs was chosen. As with the EOSS procedures, there are hundreds of
individual procedures, and future analyses could use the same process to eventually model each of
them in IMPRINT to cover most possible combinations. There are other assumptions associated
with Planned Maintenance, such as the amount of preparation time required to assemble tools and
materials, secure and tag out the system, and restore the system to full capability. These are
captured in Navy documentation for manning calculations and can be entered into the IMPRINT
model as well. Finally, there is a certain amount of time dedicated to data entry and scheduling,
as well as periodic manager spot checks which would be part of a normal routine. The model also
accounts for the means by which an operator interacts with the automated systems, defined as
“Resources”; for each of these areas, common values can be entered to assist in calculating the
overall workload, any interferences, and overall impact on mission success. These resources are
shown in Table 9.
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Table 9. Resources and Interfaces. (Source: IMPRINT User’s Guide 2012, pg. 73.
Reprinted with permission)

The remaining “missions” from the standard Navy Work Week (Sleep, Messing, Admin,
Training, Personal Time) would not require the detailed operations modeling, as the missions,
functions and tasks associated with these are essentially singular in nature and can me simulated
with a fairly simple model. These include sleeping, eating, training, admin and personal time.
They have distinct periods represented in the standard Navy Work Week and would have to be
assigned priority in the case of other unplanned events; a crew member responding to a drill may
miss training for example, which could detriment future level of knowledge, or sleep, resulting in
increased fatigue. Other “missions” such as personal and admin time, may be simply with minimal
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impact, and thus detailed modeling of these periods missed is not required. A sample work day
might resemble that in Table 10.

Table 10. Breakdown of 24-hour day by work domain.

By “modeling” the members of a watch section for a 24-hour period, the individual
missions and tasks can be examined for workload and probability of failure. By varying the
schedule (for instance, 3 section watch instead of 4, as shown above. The IMPRINT model can be
tailored to various schedules and the results compared. Previous studies have shown that there is
a significant difference in fatigue levels for watch standers in a circadian, 4 section fixed schedule
as compared to 3 sections in a rotating schedule. This is normally depicted using FAST data (based
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on a correlation between predicted and observed levels) which shows clear differences. The goal
of an IMPRINT model would be to capture the effect of these increased fatigue levels induced by
reduced number of watch sections and translate that into a risk of failure for a given set of tasks.
A comparison of these watch rotations and the resulting levels of effectiveness is shown Figure
23.

Figure 23. Predicted Effectiveness of a 5-on/10-off, 3-section watch rotation. (Hollins and
Leszczynski, 2014, p. 28)

In the above graph, the gradient between yellow and red represents what standard military planners
define as “acceptable” level of effectiveness, or roughly the level of impairment corresponding to
a Blood Alcohol Level (BAC) of 0.08, or legally drunk.
Modeling every possible mission, function and task for a 50-plus person crew under several
operating conditions would create a model with an almost endless variety of layers and outcomes.
While this is obviously the most robust option, a series of informed decisions, based on either
existing policy or operator experience, can reduce the family of missions and functions required
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to be modeled to a more reasonable number, allowing the model to run as a “proof of concept” and
showing its viability. Tailoring these results based on the input of real operators as seen in the
2016 survey results can further refine the problem and support the thesis that this model is
representative of the larger space, and perhaps justify the expense and time of creating a more
complete model. A summary of the project delimitations is related below.
Operators: The Littoral Combat Ship has a base crew of 50 personnel, divided into 3 major
Departments: Engineering. Combat Systems, Operations. The Modules (designed for a specific
warfare area) have a separate crew with operators and maintainers. For this study, Engineering
Department was chosen since the majority of the known failures have occurred on Engineering
Equipment.

Engineering Department is further divided into two divisions, Electrical and

Mechanical.

Since individuals from both divisions stand watch and perform planned and

corrective maintenance on the equipment in this department, one individual from each division
was modeled. In addition to performing maintenance, these individuals stand watch as part of a 2person team, with one Officer or Chief Petty Officer acting as the supervisor, and one Mechanic
and one Electrician as subordinate watch standers. Officers are not modeled in IMPRINT and
rarely operate equipment, so the model is limited to the two enlisted crew members. The watch
rotation is shown in Table 11.
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Table 11: LCS Underway Watch (Condition III) Rotation - Red circle shows Engineer Team. (A
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MANPOWER ANALYSIS, Mckinnya J. Williams-Robinson,
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007 p.30)

Equipment: The major components that provide propulsion and electric power are main
engines (two gas turbine and two diesel), two diesel generators for electric power, and associated
support systems including lube oil, cooling water, air conditioning, and electrical distribution
system. Since known failures have occurred in several of these components, all were considered
for the analysis, although only a selection of operating and maintenance procedures was modeled
for proof of concept.
Operating Condition: Since the majority of the failures have occurred during normal
steaming underway, and since this is basis for existing Navy manpower models, the LCS is
considered underway in condition III, in three watch sections for the analysis.
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Procedures: There is a very large set of procedures related to maintenance and operation of
the LCS platform. In order to conduct a proof of concept and modeling to the detail required, a
sampling process is necessary. While many options are available to select a final set of procedures
for a proof of concept, the process defined below is based on a combination of experience,
available procedures, failure data, and risk analysis. A process map of this procedure is shown in
Figure 24.

Figure 24. Overview of Sampling Protocol

The procedures used by the crew generally fall into one of 3 categories.
1.

Corrective Maintenance: The procedures for corrective maintenance are usually
developed on a case by case basis, but they are generally based on failure data stored
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in a document called the Consolidated Ships Maintenance Project, or CSMP. The
entries in this system are sorted by system and component, often referred to as
“parent” and “Child”. There is an entry for each failure and each one includes the
following data fields:

Entry Block

Information

Hierarchal Sequence Number

A discrete identifier for the system and component

Location

The physical location of the component

Problem Description

A freeform paragraph describing the failure – cause,
severity, impact

Recommended Solution

The

Reference

Technical Manual or Maintenance Procedure

Priority

1 through 4 based on mission impact (1 is highest)

Date

The date discovered

ship’s recommendation
repair procedure

for

a

Table 12. Navy Corrective Maintenance Job Description Criteria

A typical LCS ship has approximately 1200 total entries at any given time, and they
can be sorted by system to find the systems with the highest number of failures. For
this analysis, a 6-year data set was analyzed consisting of 20,245 entries, of which
some 10% were “placeholders” for scheduling of inspections, etc. The remaining
discrepancies were sorted by Hierarchal Sequence Number (HSC) which separates
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them into categories by type of equipment (i.e., Diesel Engine, Navigation, etc.). This
was then graphed as a Pareto chart, as shown in Figure 25 and Appendix B.

Pareto Chart
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Engineering

Bridge
Other

Figure 25. Pareto Chart of LCS Failure Data (6-yr summary)

In order to determine the best subset to focus the analysis, the results of the first Pareto
chart were weighted using a “Mission Impact” scale of 1 to 3 (1 being lowest, 3
highest) to focus on the discrepancies with the highest potential impact of failure to
mission. The decision for rating a system 1 to 3 was based on operator experience
and the known mission failures mentioned earlier in the paper. This generated a
slightly different Pareto chart in Figure 26.
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Weighted Value
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Figure 26. Weighted Pareto Chart (accounting for mission impact)

Based on this information, a selection of individual jobs was selected for modeling
from the HSC components listed in the top 50% of the Pareto Analysis. This was
also the criteria for selecting Operating and Planned Maintenance Procedures for
modeling in the next steps. Delimitation. In researching the documentation for
maintenance and operations, as well as the causes of the most significant failures, it
was found that engineering procedures were generally more accessible and presented
a more robust case for modeling. For these reasons, further analysis was limited to
engineering procedures for corrective maintenance, planned maintenance, and
operations.
2.

Engineering Operating Sequence Procedures: These are formal procedures used to
define operation of the Engineering Plant. These are generally 1-2 pages long and
provide step by step directions to be, followed by the operators. For the engineering
operators in question there are a total of 63 EOSS procedures that fall into two
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categories: Routine and Emergency Procedures. Based on the known incidents of
failure and the record of failure data contained in the maintenance records of LCS-1,
the following procedures were selected for risk analysis (the full matrix is included
as appendix E):

EOSS
Nr.
CAEPA

Component
Electric Plant

Title
Alignment Procedures

FOMT

Service and Storage
Stripping water and contaminants
Tanks
Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Align for Remote Operations

FOAS
CPTM
CPDME
CLOP
CFOP
BGTM
CASF
CASSDG

Fuel Oil Service System
Gas Turbine Brake
Main Propulsion Diesel
Lube Oil Pumps
Fuel Oil Pumps
B Fire GTM
Electric Plant
Cool Air

Align for Operation
Operation, motoring
Starting/Operating/Stopping
Starting/Stopping
Starting/Stopping
B Fire
Bus Tie Parallel
Failure

CASG
CSFG
CED

Gas Turbine Generator
Diesel
Educator

Fire
Fire
Operation, motoring

CFD
CFOSS
CFP
CFMPO
CHAA
MLOL
CPTM
CPWS
CFSRT
EPOP

Fuel
Boats
Fire Pump
EDG
CHT
Main Lube Oil
Console
Potable Water
Fuel System
Electric Plant

Sample Detector
Fuel
Operation, motoring
Console Operation
Alarm
Pump Operation
Operation
Operation, motoring
Refuel Helicopter
Operation, motoring

FSST

Table 13. Initial selection of Critical Operational Procedures
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EOSS
Nr.
EPT
FOAS
GTES
HBDG

Component
Power Turbine
Fuel Oil System
Gas Turbine
Hot Bearing

Title
Vibration
Align
Start
Casualty Response

FPM

Fire Pump

Operation, motoring

Table 13. Initial selection of Critical Operational Procedures (continued)

3.

Planned Maintenance Procedures: These are formal procedures that are used to
conduct routine maintenance on engineering equipment. They are categorized by
system in a document called a Maintenance Index Page (MIP) and then by individual
Maintenance Requirements Cards (MRC).

The work centers that perform

maintenance on engineering equipment are machinists (EA Division) and electricians
(EE Divisions). There is a total of 76 MIPs in the EA division PMS schedule, and a
total of 875 individual MRC’s. Based on the weighted Pareto analysis above, the
following MIP’s were selected for risk/impact analysis:
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MIP

MRC

Nomenclature

2331

4M-5

Diesel Engine Governor Lube

4-M6

Inspect LO Pump

9M-1

Engine Test

M-1R

LO Sample

M-6

Inspect Air Filter

R-3D

LO Viscosity Test

W-1R

Inspect Loop Seal

8M-1

Power

A-9

Inspect LO Cooler

A-1

GT Oil Sample

W=2R

Test GT LO Flash Point

M-1R

Clean Air Filter

M-2

Replace Air Filter

R-34M

Test Air Flow

R-33D

Reduction Gear Pilot Light

R-4D

Stern Seal Leakage

R2-W

Flash Point Test

R-10W

Drain Water from Filter

2341

2342

2418

2531

2471
256

Turbine LO Sample

Seawater Cooling
Table 14. Initial Selection of Planned Maintenance Procedures

The full risk matrix is included as Appendix D. From the above procedures, a select
few were used as a representative sample for modeling using the risk analysis method
outlined in the next step.
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4.5

IMPRINT MANPOWER MODEL VERIFICATION
In order to evaluate the integrated system using IMPRINT, an integrated Risk Analysis

must be performed in the various procedures to select a defensible subset for analysis. Risk
analysis consists of determining the combination of “likelihood” and “severity” of a particular
event in order to determine its impact. Table 15 represents a standard risk analysis chart and shows
the resulting risk values in a generic fashion. Table 16 is that three-dimension risk analysis tailored
to LCS Procedure Analysis Protocol. Table 17 specifies the risk definitions applied to each level.

Table 15. Standard Risk Analysis Table

In order to define risk in more precise terms to support this analysis, a 3-Dimensional Risk Matrix
was developed by normalizing the Navy vernacular (For example, the Navy assigns 4 levels of
“impact” and of “likelihood” in their maintenance and casualty documentation. The next step
consists of combining the criteria from the above table into a single table that accounts for all three
factors: Frequency, Impact, and Degree of Automation. Breakpoints for Red, Yellow and Green
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were correlated to the standard risk matrix (for example, the highest value is a 4x4x4=64). The
results are shown in Table 18.

Table 16. 3-D Risk Table (tailored to LCS Procedure Analysis Protocol)
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Table 17. Tailored Task Risk Matrix Definitions

Final Selection of Procedures: Due to the extensive detail required for IMPRINT modeling
and the focus of this “proof of concept”, this analyst selected 3 procedures from each category
(Corrective Maintenance, Planned Maintenance, and Operating Procedures) to build a complete
workflow model and program IMPRINT. These three were selected based on the following
criteria:
a.

Related to a high impact documented failure

b.

A risk factor of Yellow or Red

c.

A mix of levels of automation from mainly human/mechanical to highly automated
Table 18 represents the results of this analysis for the Operating Procedures as an
example of how this process was applied.
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Table 18. Critical Operating Procedures
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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: Once the tasks have been selected for modeling based
on the risk of mission failure as described above, the next process to be applied is the Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis. The basic steps of this are defined below:
a.

Define the system

b.

Define ground rules and assumptions

c.

Construct system block diagrams

d.

Identify failure modes

e.

Analyze failure effects and causes

f.

Feed results back into design process

In order to accomplish this, a total of 9 tasks were selected, 3 from each area (corrective
maintenance, planned maintenance, and operational procedures). A standard tool for the above
analysis is called the Out of Control Action Plan, or in this case the IMPRINT Action Plan, which
was a plan adapted and built for each procedure to be analyzed using the critical failure modes to
capture design changes that may be required. An example Critical Failure Analysis for one of the
selected procedures is shown in Figure 27.
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Figure 27. Modified Action Table for LCS Analysis (entry into IMPRINT)

Using the Task Analysis Worksheets, each task is broken into its discrete subtask elements
and critical failure modes are identified. Once these have been identified, the cause and effects
noted, and results can be programmed back into the model. Model runs can then be compared to
determine if risk of failure changed due to these updates, resulting in possible improvements. The
below form was developed to capture the critical failure modes of the key steps in each procedure,
and one example is presented in Table 19 (the remainder are included in Appendix H):
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Table 19. Failure Mode Analysis Key and Example.

Workload: IMPRINT captures the workload for each operator compared to a user selected
“threshold”, in this case set at 60% of the individual’s capacity. This is the default condition for
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IMPRINT, and corresponds to other research showing that this is the point at which a skilled
operator becomes “task saturated” and has to either prioritize or shed tasks in order to accomplish
the mission (Columbi et al, pg. 454). A report is then generated that shows the actual workload
over the course of the mission against this threshold. The below graph is an example of a single
run of the IMPRINT scenario with the graphs of the workload vs. time of the two Engineering
operators (RCO and EPT) as they execute the watch duties. By setting thresholds in workload and
comparing the results of multiple runs, the changes in workload can be visualized and the effects
of changing a single parameter (for example, hours without sleep) can be seen. In the figure below,
for example, the effects of an alarm at time 21:36 can be seen as a short spike in workload; in this
case the total capacity is not exceeded, but the effects are clear.

Alarm

Figure 28. IMPRINT Workload Graph of Engineering Operators (EPT/RCO/Automation)
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The above graph would be extremely useful in comparing workloads of operators under a variety
of conditions, and to demonstrate the effects of unplanned events that may distract from the task
at hand (i.e., the alarm circled in the diagram above) or more encompassing events like a casualty
response to a fire or flooding, which could consume the entire watch team for a significant portion
of the watch period. IMPRINT can also capture instances and specific tasks where workload
exceeds the threshold and may result in a task failure and, if that task is linked to accomplishment
of the mission, a complete abortion of the mission. Such an analysis would show what parts of a
particular procedure would contain the highest risk of failure in a modeling scenario and allow for
consideration of changes to the manpower level, the procedure, or the time allotted for the
procedures. One consideration in constructing the watch period for this model was that there was
a set of operating procedures, a planned maintenance procedure, and a corrective maintenance
procedure scheduled for the 3-hour period, resulting in a high concentration of workload at period
when operators (mainly the EPT) were trying to multi-task. IMPRINT also has a simulation
function to capture the cognitive aspects of various tasks and model how they interfere with one
another – for example the sound of an alarm interfering with concentration while attempting to
follow a procedure or give a verbal order. An example of this is shown below. This sample shows
the potential of IMPRINT workload functionality to model a fairly complex work period using
detailed procedures to focus on the areas of highest risk and assist planners in making risk
decisions.
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Table 20. Resource Interface Cognitive Interferences.

Fatigue: IMPRINT can also model the fatigue of the operator as a Performance Shaping
Factor (PSF) that can be toggled between choices of “Sleepless Hours” from 0-24, 25-48, and so
on. In this example, the Watch Period mission was executed with the default setting of 0-24
Sleepless Hours. The initial run shows a task failure rate of only 4 failures, as shown in Table 21.

Table 21. IMPRINT Task Failure Report (PSF “Sleepless Hours” set at 0-24)

After the above mission run, the “Sleepless Hours” for both operators was changed to “25 to 48”
and the mission run again. Table 22 demonstrates these results.
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Table 22. IMPRINT Task Failure Report (PSF “Sleepless Hours” set at 25-48 hrs.)

When the “sleepless hours” is set to “25-48” a total of 11 failures occur, a 275 percent increase.
While some of these can be attributed to the variability in the IMRINT model, this data clearly
demonstrates that the error rate increases dramatically when hours without sleep is increased, and
that IMPRINT is capable of modeling this effect.

In practice, this result can be further

deconstructed to show the actual impact of fatigue on each task associated with each mission as
seen in the screen capture below in Table 23.
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Table 23. IMPRINT Task Summary showing effects of changing Sleepless Hours PSF

The above table shows the effects of fatigue in several areas. Specifically, a large number
of tasks (as in the blue highlighted task) show an increased time to complete them, a reduced
accuracy, and a decreased probability of success. An expanded table shows an example of these
specifics (Table 24).

Task 5.1 Attribute/
Sleepless Hours

0-24 hrs.

25-48 hrs.

Delta

Time (hr./mm/ss)

00:15:00

00:16:04

+01:04

Accuracy (%)

96.27

90

-6.27

Probability of
Success (%)

84.13

64.55

-19.59

Table 24. Detail of effects on time, accuracy, and probability of success
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An additional possibility in IMPRINT is to run multiple iterations of a mission and
capture the results in terms of mission success. The following graphs show the increase in
mission failures when sleepless hours are increased from “0-24” to “25-48”. A two-sample ptest was conducted in Minitab 18® for statistical difference Ho: p (25-48; 41/150 = 0.273) – p (024; 34/150 = 0.227) equal 0 versus Ha: not equal 0. The Minitab output reported no statistical
difference with p-value = 0.351. and 95% confidence interval (-0.0512, 0.1445). This lack of
statistical difference is most likely an artifact of IMPRINT’s lack of categorical resolution of
sleepless hours 0-24 and sleepless hours 25-48. Studies over the last 50 years have demonstrated
that the relationship between fatigue and hours sleep deprivation is asymptotically increasing
one. Benitez, et al. (2009) modeled the effect of sleep deprivation on performance over the range
of zero to 72 hours. They found that relative reaction time increased over the range of zero to
20-hours, approximately leveled (with caffeine) or slightly declined (with no caffeine) up to
about 40-hours deprivation, increased between 41 and 48-hours deprivation, leveled or slightly
declined between 49 and 65-hours, and increased up to 72 hours. Given the noise in their data
and averaging over 0 to 24 hours and 25 to 48 hours, as in IMPRINT’s categorical ranges, there
should be no statistical difference in the observed p-values. The results are summarized below:

Test and CI for Two Proportions
Sample
1
2

X
41
34

N
150
150

Sample p
0.273333
0.226667

Difference = p (1) - p (2)
Estimate for difference: 0.0466667
95% CI for difference: (-0.0511892, 0.144522)
Test for difference = 0 (vs ≠ 0): Z = 0.93 P-Value = 0.351
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Figure 29. Graph of mission failure comparison for multiple runs (n=150) with aborted missions
on the left of each graph and successful missions on the right.

This selection of reports is the basis for the discussions and conclusions in the next chapter
and is intended merely to demonstrate the range of information available from the IMPRINT model
and the potential to model a wide variety of missions, functions and tasks.
Automation-Human Interface: IMPRINT is primarily designed as a human operator model,
and as such the algorithms for automation are designed to operate in an optimal manner – that is,
success is automatically 100 per cent and workload capacity is assumed to be infinite (IMPRINT
User’s Guide). In working with the designer, however, it is possible to create a simulation for the
automation by assigning the system as another operator and capturing its workload and failure rate.
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Looking again at the workload diagram from above, the circle captures the “system” tasks and
workload where it occurs in the model. This is shown in Figure 30.

Automation

Figure 30. IMPRINT Workload Graph showing Automation (simulated).

While the actual programming of this feature would require access to the automation functionality
and is beyond the scope of this project, this process could be coded into IMPRINT and could
eventually be used to better capture a more realistic simulation of automation, especially once
detailed failure data was available, perhaps in a future research project. This feature would be
especially helpful as ships become more and more automated.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

5.1

OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS.
The project started with a hypothesis that the LCS Crew modeling could be improved by

using the IMPRINT program, which had been used extensively in Army applications and to some
extent in analysis of the LCS crew, could be improved using data derived from crew surveys and
an examination of the actual procedures (watch, operations, and maintenance) used by crew
members, to modify the Operations Module of IMPRINT. The majority of the studies conducted
in the past used the Force Model feature of IMPRINT; in this more global force level manpower
study, “workload” is just simple engagement with high level activities. In a detailed human
performance study using the IMPRINT Operations Model used in this project, workload is the
mental capacity being utilized to perform more definitive tasks. The detailed human performance
models allow the analyst to consider outcomes such as mission times, mission completion, and
errors and their consequences as metrics. The LCS Crew survey was intended to identify the
strengths and weaknesses in manning model of the LCS automation-human operational
environment. It was important to use statistical analysis to validate the design and response
coherence of the survey itself. Consistency analysis confirmed that the results of the survey were
coherent. Multivariate analysis confirmed that the four dimensions sampled were independent,
and LCS personnel responses support that they are relevant to the design of automation-human
performance. Demographics were statistically homogeneous and independent of the survey
questions. This observation makes sense given that most individuals stand the same watch rotation
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and perform similar maintenance duties and other tasks, whether supervisory in nature or not, for
about the same amount of time each day.
The four dimensions of fatigue, maintenance tasking, watch tasking, and automationhuman integration are important for consideration in refining the LCS manning model to be
incorporated and tested in an IMPRINT model in the next phase of this research. Specifically, a
majority of those surveyed feel that fatigue, overtasking (watch and maintenance), and the degree
of automation inherent in the current manning model for LCS present significant challenges. This
leads to the conclusion that these areas merit further cognitive/physical task workflow analysis
toward refinements to the existing LCS manning model. Additionally, an examination of specific
areas of the automation-human system integration may be appropriate. One of the most significant
findings of this survey came from the joint analysis of the MJCA demographics and response
biplots. Joint analysis suggests that the design of and training for the LCS automation-human
operational environment assumes a standard Navy personnel profile and does not account for
natural differences in human capabilities.
Based on the survey results, we performed cognitive/physical task workflow analysis of
bridge and engineering tasks, as well as examining past failures, and built an initial IMPRINT
crew manning model that accounts for the four survey dimensions in the next stage of research. It
is worth noting that this survey was conducted only for the LCS class of ships; this does not imply
that these challenges are unique to LCS; perhaps an expansion to other classes of ship is worthy
of an expanded follow-on survey. References listed below were utilized in developing the survey
but are not indexed in the text; they are provided to allow the reader to focus any design of the
research.
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The workflow analysis structure performed in this paper does seem to support the viability
of this approach to model crew activity. While this study focused on a small sample (about 20%
of the sum total of procedures in each area) that were chosen based on risk analysis, the process
proved to be relatively straightforward and repeatable to expand the study to model the entire
spectrum of maintenance and operations for the engineering team, and then transpose this process
onto the bridge and other teams for a more complete analysis that is beyond the scope of this
project.
The combination of the lessons from the LCS IMPRINT survey, which validated that
operators perceive challenges with automation, overtasking, and fatigue as valid concerns in
accomplishing assigned missions and the workflow analysis performed in support of this article
form the foundation for a contribution to the body of work related to crew modeling in the future
using IMPRINT.

Specifically, the impact of human-automation integration and fatigue on

workload completion and on risk to mission success are not captured under current manpower
models, which treat each human equally without regard to human factors or limitations of the
automated portion of the machine-human interface, an ever-increasing trend in ship design.

5.2

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Other Solutions Found. In exploring the IMPRINT software, it does seem to have the basic

building blocks necessary to model a broad range of missions, and other areas of exploration into
the primary mission areas (i.e., Mine Warfare) would be possible applications since these “mission
packages” come with a discrete team of individuals tailored to the mission.
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Additional Problems Identified: Initially, the project required a steep learning curve to
build an Operations model in IMPRINT, since previous research was focused on the Crew Model,
which focuses on a broader perspective and does not “drill down” to the task level. In attempting
to translate Navy procedures into IMPRINT models, a few challenges were identified:
a.

Lack of detail in procedures. The majority of Navy procedures are simply a set of
steps, with limited explanation of the reasoning behind the procedures and, in areas
of automation, no detail in what the automated system is actually doing. This made
failure analysis challenging, as the analyst has to rely on experience to understand
the system responses.

b.

Lack of a Navy Tailored version of IMPRINT. The baseline IMPRINT scenarios
and crew models are based on an Army schematic, and while many of the attributes
carry over and tailoring was possible for a Navy scenario, having the baseline already
implemented in IMPRINT would have saved a great deal of programming time as
the process developed.

c.

Lack of definition of the Human-Automation interface. The procedures do identify
which steps require interaction with the automated systems and the expected
responses, but there is no delineation that clarifies the role of automation, leaving it
up to the analysist to decide as to the degree of automation. In this case, the author
has a good deal of experience with Navy ships and automated systems, so educated
estimates were possible.

d.

Fatigue Modeling in IMPRINT. The Navy’s primary modeling tool for the effects
of fatigue is the FAST tool, which provides a detailed output in terms of
“effectiveness” at certain tasks based on the sleep amounts and daily schedule that is
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input. Unfortunately, the IMPRINT model, while it does have a fatigue element in
the human-factors module, is limited in fidelity (a pull-down menu for “hours without
sleep”: 024 hrs., 24-48, etc.) is useful but does not capture the Navy model of a
rotating or fixed watch schedule.
Recommendations for Future Performance Improvement: If the Navy wanted to use
IMPRINT as a tool for modeling the entire crew of a ship at the Operations Model, a few
changes would greatly facilitate this effort, specifically.
a.

FAST Model integration. Many of the crew surveyed perceived fatigue as an
impediment to mission accomplishment. A way to integrate the output of the FAST
model directly into IMPRINT would allow for much more fidelity in determining the
effects of manning and watch rotation changes on the level of risk to mission resulting
from these changes. This could be accomplished in the “Performance Shaping”
module of IMPRINT. There is an add-on that can be implemented but it was not
used in this particular analysis, and it could be tailored for future detailed studies
using actual crew fatigue data.

b.

Navy Crew Tailoring. While demographics was considered as part of the LCS crew
survey, there is a possibility that it could factor more heavily into future more detailed
analysis. To facilitate future modeling efforts, the detailed specialties (Navy Enlisted
Classifications) could be pre-loaded into IMPRINT and a watch assignment matrix
based on ship’s manning documents could be programmed in as a baseline for future
analysis and updated to reflect current doctrine and requirements, as well as better
reflect the limitations of experience and training and their effect on performance.
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There are versions of this in existence that could be tailored to match ship manpower
profiles.
c.

Increased visibility of the Human-Automation Interface. As automation increases in
Navy ships, the procedures could be improved by providing more detail on the actual
degree of automation and the failure modes/expected responses to assist operators at
various levels of training in utilizing the procedures. The current LCS pipeline is
over 18 months long and could be perhaps shortened if the procedures and automation
were more comprehensive and transparent.

d.

For more complex and detailed modeling, one recommendation would be to assign
the task to a small team consisting of a Navy Subject Matter Expert, an IMPRINT
expert, and a researcher with extensive experience in workload modeling. This
would dramatically increase the speed of building the model and improve the
accuracy and validity at several stages, including the risk analysis and time-motion
analysis. Observation of some of the tasks to validate times and effects would also
be an improvement that was beyond the scope of this initial proof of concept.

5.3

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
There were two limitations to the risk analysis process: (1) the risk analysis of the

procedures would have benefitted from a “colleague interrater reliability” exercise, subjecting the
decision process to multiple subject matter experts to refine the solution, and (2) the risk analysis
was not subjected to review by actual Naval personnel; these are mitigated by the fact that the
purpose of the risk assessments was not to provide direct feedback about specific procedures but
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merely to serve as a means to support the proof of concept. These two steps would be a
recommended improvement for future research and would add rigor to an analysis that would be
used to support decision making.
There were two limitations related to changes in the LCS crews since the survey was
completed: (1) the LCS crew manning policies have changed since the completion of the initial
survey, including increased manning, modified crew composition, and the implementation of
circadian watch rotations; these were not accounted for in this analysis but would be worthy of
note and comparison in a future survey. (2) In the interim, the size of the respondent pool has
increased. These changes would need to be accounted for in any future survey and are mitigated
by the fact that the survey was not the main effort of this project but was merely intended to inform
the IMPRINT modeling process scenario failure modes, and thus a less robust sample size was
deemed acceptable in this context.
To truly capture the interactions between crew members and teams, a similar study would
be necessary including all three watch teams on the bridge and in engineering. Limited access to
detailed procedures for the bridge and the varied nature of bridge operations and maintenance
(compared to the fairly narrow scope of engineering operations) would require a broader
application of this analysis.

This “proof of concept” was able to show that, with minor

modifications, the IMPRINT program can be used to model more complex aspects of the Sailor
workload using existing documentation and task structure of differing levels of tasking (or
overtasking), automation, and fatigue and the resulting changes in risk of failure in discrete teams.
As demonstrated in the IMPRINT modeling runs, as each of these factors is increased, the risk of
mission failure increases. While this was only a limited study, it lays the foundation for a more
robust model. This model can provide feedback for both the number of operators (for example,
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adding a fourth watch section to reduce fatigue) or improving the explanation of failure modes in
procedures with a high level of automation so that operators can gain a better understanding of
what the automation is or is not doing. By examining a small subset of the crew, focused on areas
where previous mission failures can be associated to either overtasking, understaffing, lack of
understanding of automated features, or fatigue, designers can achieve a better prediction of the
impact of manpower decisions. This work can be a foundation upon which a model of the entire
crew can be built using a modified version of IMPRINT.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

6.1

PRIMARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY
The primary contribution of this analysis is a “Proof of Concept” that demonstrates a viable

method of applying a Time-Motion Risk Integration process to model Human-Automation
workflow as a tool for operational risk analysis. Other contributions are as follows:
a. The LCS Crew Survey showed that fatigue, workload, and the human-automation
interface are perceived by experienced crew members as factors that impact the ability
of the crew to operate and maintain the ship. This is an important data point that could
be used as a starting point for future surveys or analyses without the need to validate
the veracity of the survey, which was confirmed herein by robust statistical analysis.
b. The detailed workflow analysis process for Navy procedures could be implemented as
developed here to dramatically expand the number of procedures available for a future
use of IMPRINT. Since the “proof of concept” demonstrated that IMPRINT has the
capability to model the workload of a small watch team using the Naval Allowance
Factor (formerly Navy Standard Work Week) and crew model, this model could be
used to build a more complete “library” of operating and maintenance procedures that
could be used in an expanded model.
c. The analysis provided a template for developing an improved cognitive element to
Navy procedures, which could be implemented as way of accounting for the
effectiveness and risks inherent in the design of the Human-Automation interface, vice
assuming that all automated functions are fully reliable. Since this capability is not
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currently part of the IMPRINT model, it was simulated by assigning “Automation” as
if it were a human; this could be programmed into a future version of IMPRINT to
accomplish the same thing on a repeatable basis.
d. The analysis showed the effect of fatigue on effectiveness during a representative watch
period, with a mix of operating, corrective, planned maintenance, and emergency
procedures executed over a finite time at varying fatigue levels. This demonstrates that
it is possible to apply the Navy Allowance Factor template in IMPRINT to determine
the increase risk from fatigue resulting from manpower decisions that affect the number
of personnel available to stand watch, as well as the effects of a circadian vice
noncircadian rotation, if FAST (Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool) and other fatigue
refinements were made to the IMPRINT program to allow a more detailed modeling of
human fatigue.
e. The analysis showed that IMPRINT Operations Model is capable of modeling the
workload of individual operators and conducting a fairly robust failure mode analysis
of critical procedures. With some refinement, this process could be used to model and
analyze current operational and maintenance procedures, proposed procedures, and
provide risk analysis for manpower decisions for LCS and future ship classes.

6.2

WIDENING THE SCOPE
This analysis was limited to the Engineering watch team as a proof of concept, although

one member of the team actually stands watch on the bridge. The next logical step would be to
model all 3 or 4 entire watch teams on the Bridge and Engineering, since this is where the primary
mission failures in the program have occurred. Operations modeling of multiple watch teams could
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allow more robust analysis of team workload, work sharing, and interactive dynamics of unplanned
operations (such as Flight Operations or emergencies). This would be the next logical progression
now that the building blocks and process map has been established for turning standard Navy
maintenance and operations procedures into IMPRINT missions, functions, and tasks in this
project.

6.3

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The following suggestions would allow researchers to expand on the work described in this

analysis:
a. Building a larger model. If further study proves these contributions to be valid, one
recommendation would be to build an Operations Model of the three main watch areas
of the LCS (or future ship design) that could in place and readily available as a baseline
to feed more informed risk analysis into the way the Navy models shipboard manpower.
This could result in better manning decisions that lead to increased crew safety and
decreased mission impacting mechanical failures when operating these ships at sea.
b. Conduct an actual at-sea validation by observing real individuals performing operating
and maintenance procedures to capture times, record the frequency of errors, and
measure other factors such as fatigue and workload to validate the model results. These
could then be entered into the notional model to give a more realistic set of parameters
and facilitate better analysis of the possible outcomes when running the model.
c. Build an “Automation” function for IMPRINT that could capture the steps of
procedures that are assumed to be perfectly executed by the system and look for areas
where actual failure modes, causes, and mitigations can be inserted back into Navy
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procedures. This would create a more realistic expectation on the part of operators and
could reduce errors associated with the automation-human interface.
d. Consider the use of the results of this modeling process as a basis to make
recommendations to the manning program during the acquisition process to include the
impact of fatigue, workload thresholds, and automation on operational risk.
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APPENDIX A
LCS WATCH TEAM COMPOSITION

Source: LCS Underway Watch (Condition III) Rotation - Red circle shows Engineer Team. (A
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MANPOWER ANALYSIS USING THE FLEET RESPONSE
TRAINING PLAN, Mckinnya J. Williams-Robinson, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007,
p. 30)
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APPENDIX B
FAILURE MODE PARETO ANALYSIS
A typical LCS ship has approximately 1200 total entries at any given time, and they can be sorted
by system to find the systems with the highest number of failures. For this analysis, a 6-year data
set was analyzed consisting of 20,245 entries, of which some 10% were “placeholders” for
scheduling of inspections, etc. The remaining discrepancies were sorted by Hierarchal Sequence
Number (HSC) which separates them into categories by type of equipment (i.e., Diesel Engine,
Navigation, etc.). This was then graphed as a Pareto chart, as shown below:

Pareto Chart of LCS Failure Data (6-yr summary)

In order to determine the best subset to focus the analysis, the results of the first Pareto chart were
weighted using a “Mission Impact” scale of 1 to 3 (1 being lowest, 3 highest) to focus on the
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discrepancies with the highest potential impact of failure to mission. The decision for rating a
system 1 to 3 was based on operator experience and the known mission failures mentioned earlier
in the paper. This generated a slightly different chart:

Weighted Value
3000
2500
2000

Engineering
Bridge

1500
1000
500
0

Other
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APPENDIX C
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE
The following maintenance failures were selected based on the fact that they were listed as
Priority 1, 2, or 3 maintenance items and that they were associated with equipment that was in
the higher end of the Pareto analysis shown in Appendix B. They were then analyzed using the
Risk Matrix to determine the most appropriate for modeling:

jcn

20126EA
014911

20126EA
014681

20126EA
014631

20126EA
014617

priority
_code

eswbs_
opening

eic
nomen
clature

csmp_
narrative
summary

problem_description

Frequency

Degree of
Automation

Impact

Risk
Value

1

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

DURING OPEN END
INSPECTION IT WAS
DISCOVERED THAT
THE FILTER
ASSEMBLY SHOWS
SIGNS OF WARE AND
METAL SHAVINGS.

1

4

2

8

1

GENER
NR 2 SSDG OOC DUE
ATOR
TO A FAILED FUEL
SET,
RECOVERY BLOCK
60HZ,
AND ASSOCIATED
DIESEL
CONNECTION FITTING.
ENGINE NR 2 SSDG IMPACT: NR 2 SSDG
31122 DRIVEN OOC
DEGRADED.

2

4

3

24

2

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

NR 1 MPDE JW PUMP
TRIPPED THE CIRCUIT
BREAKER.
S/F INSPECTION
IDENTIFIED PUMP
MOTOR OOC DUE TO
INTERNAL CORROSION
AND
DAMAGED WIRING.

2

4

2

16

2

NR 2 SSDG VOLTAGE
GENER
REGULATOR
ATOR
BREAKER TRIPPED
SET,
WHILE SHIFTING
60HZ,
FROM SHIP POWER TO
DIESEL
SHORE POWER..
ENGINE NR 2 SSDG IMPACT: NR 2 SSDG
31122 DRIVEN OOC
OOC.

2

4

2

16

MPDE
FILTER
WARN

NR 1
MPDE JW
PUMP
OOC
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20126EA
015090

2

GENER
ATOR
SET,
60HZ,
31122 DIESEL

NR 2
SSDG
FUEL OIL
LEAK

20126EA
013939

2

3

GENER
ATOR
SET,
60HZ,
NR 3
DIESEL
SSDG
ENGINE THERMOC
31123 DRIVEN OUPLES

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

2

4

1

8

S/F IDENTIFIED THAT
THERMOCOUPLES ON
NR 3 SSDG ARE
DEGRADED. IMPACT:
MPCMS EXHAUST
TEMPERATURES FOR
NR 3 SSDG ARE
INACCURATE AND
DO NOT ALLOW FOR
PROPER
MONITORING OF NR
3 SSDG.

2

2

4

16

S/F IDENTIFIED
MOATTI FUEL FILTER
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE
TRANSMITTER ON NR
2 MPDE IS FAILING
AND WILL
EVENTUALLY REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT.
IMPACT: EVENTUAL
FAILURE WILL
RESULT IN INABILITY
TO MONITOR FUEL
OIL FILTER
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE. LIMITED
OPERATIONAL
IMPACT.

3

2

3

18

RING REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT.
IMPACT: REPAIR
REQUIRED BEFORE
OPERATING NR 2
SSDG.

ENGINE
DRIVEN

20126EA
014041

S/F IDENTIFIED A
LEAK ON THE
ATTACHED FUEL OIL
PUMP. MECHANICAL
SEAL AND RETAINING

MPDE
PRESS
TRANSMI
TTER
ORDER
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20126EA
013992

20126EA
014222

20126EA
014789

20126EA
015264

MPDE
CONTROL
AIR
FILTERS
ORDER

S/F REQUIRES ONHAND SPARES OF
MPDE CONTROL AIR
FILTER
ELEMENTS.
ELEMENTS WERE
INSTALLED DURING
FEBRUARY 2013
AVAILABILITY AND
HAVE NOT BEEN
UPDATED AS PART
OF ON-HAND STOCK,
COSAL OR PMS
DATABASES. DUE TO
LACK OF CURRENT
STOCK.

3

2

3

18

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

STBD
MPDE
MOATTI
MOTOR
OOC

S/F DISCOVERED
STBD MPDE MOATTI
FUEL FILTER WAS NOT
SPINNING.
UPON FURTHER
INVESTIGATION, S/F
FOUND THAT THE
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
HAD FAILED AND THE
SELF-CLEANING
FUNCTION OF THE
FUEL FILTER WAS
COMPLETELY
DEGRADED. S/F
REQUIRES
REPLACEMENT
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
TO RESTORE STBD
MPDE MOATTI FUEL
FILTER TO FULL
OPERABILITY..

3

2

2

12

3

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

NR 1
MPDE SW
PUMP
GAUGE
LINE

NR 1 MPDE
ATTACHED SW PUMP
GAUGE LINE FAILED
DUE TO SHEARED
FITTING.

1

2

1

2

3

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

MISSING
GASKETS

MPDES REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT OF
LEAKY GASKETS.

3

1

1

3

3

3

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL
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20126EA
015571

20126EA
015590

20126EA
014271

20126EA
015131

20126EA
015138

20126EA
015169

3

3

3

3

3

3

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

FAULTY
J/W
CIRCUIT
CARD

ENGINE
23311 , DIESEL

MECH
SEAL
FAILED NR
1 MPDE

ENGINE
23312 , DIESEL

FUEL OIL LEAK ON
NR2 MPDE A
CHIPPED COUPLING
INJECTOR WAS
DETERMINED TO BE
THE ROOT CAUSE OF
THE LEAK AND MUST
BE REPLACED
PORT
BEFORE OPERATING
MPDE
NR2 MPDE. 1 OF 2
OOCMPDE'S OOC.

ENGINE
23312 , DIESEL

ENGINE
23312 , DIESEL

ENGINE
23312 , DIESEL

CIRCUIT CARD FOR
JACKET WATER HIGH
TEMP ALARM AND
SHUTDOWN IS OOC.

3

2

3

18

2

3

1

6

2

4

1

8

NR 2
MPDE
FUEL LEAK

NR 2 MPDE OOC DUE
TO A FUEL LEAK ON
THE FUEL PIPE
LEADING
ASSOCIATED WITH
CYLINDER B6
INJECTOR. IMPACT:
REPAIR REQUIRED
BEFORE OPERATING
NR 2 MPDE.

1

4

2

8

NR 2
MPDE
PNEUMAT
IC VALVE

NR 2 MPDE P2-P5
VALVE RECEIVING
FALSE SIGNAL TO
OPEN DUE TO A
FAILED
PNEUMATIC
VALVE. IMPACT:
POTENTIAL FOR
DECREASED OUTPUT
PRESSURE ON THE
TURBOCHARGER DUE
TO OPEN VALVE.

2

2

3

12

NR 2
MPDE SW
FLAPPER
VALVE

VALVE ASSEMBLY PIN
HOUSING WAS
DEFORMED CAUSING
PIN TO BEND AND
VALVE TO SEIZE.
VALVE ASSEMBLY
AND ASSOCIATED
COMPONENTS
REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT.

2

2

2

8

MECHANICAL SEAL
FAILED ON NR 1
MPDE JACKET WATER
KEEP WARM PUMP.
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20126EA
015496

20126EA
015589

20126EA
014612

3

3

3

ENGINE
23312 , DIESEL

NR 2
MPDE
AIR
MOTOR
SEIZED

NR 1 MPDE AIR
MOTOR BARRING
DEVICE IS SEIZED.

2

2

2

8

ENGINE
23312 , DIESEL

MECH
SEAL
FAILED NR
2 MPDE

MECHANICAL SEAL
ON NR 2 MPDE IS
GIVING INDICATION
OF IMPENDING
FAILURE.

2

3

2

12

NR 1 GTE V-BAND
CLAMP BROKEN. 1
OF 2 V-BAND
CLAMPS SECURING
THE ANTI-ICING
SUPPLY HOSE TO THE
ANTI-ICING CONTROL
VALVE FAILED. GTE
BLEED AIR SYSTEM
SUPPLIES THE
ANTIICING SUPPLY
HOSE VIA THE ANTIICING
CONTROL VALVE. S/F
UNABLE TO
MECHANICALLY OR
ELECTRICALLY
ISOLATE THE
ANTIICING CONTROL
VALVE.
INADVERTENT
ALIGNMENT OF THE
ANTI-ICING SYSTEM
POSSIBLE WITHOUT
THE ABILITY TO
ISOLATE THE ANTIICING CONTROL
VALVE. ALIGNMENT
OF THE ANTI-ICING
SYSTEM COULD
CAUSE THE
SECONDARY V-BAND
CLAMP TO FAIL ON
THE ANTI-ICING
SUPPLY HOSE.
IMPACT: NR 1 GTE
OOC UNTIL
REPLACEMENT VBAND CLAMP IS
RECEIVED AND
INSTALLED.

2

1

2

4

PROPU
LSION
SYSTEM
, MAIN
GAS
TURBIN
E,
MECHA NR 1 GTE
NICAL
V-BAND
23411 DRIVE
CLAMP
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20126EA
013895

20126EA
014734

20126EA
014792

20126EA
015442

20126EA
013892

3

GEAR
ASSEM
BLY,
MAIN
REDUC
24111 TION

3

GEAR
ASSEM
BLY,
MAIN
REDUC
24111 TION

3

GEAR
ASSEM
BLY,
MAIN
REDUC
24111 TION

3

3

GEAR
ASSEM
BLY,
MAIN
REDUC
24111 TION

MRG
FILTER
REPLACE
MENTS

DUE TO WATER
INTRUSION IN THE
PORT COMBINING
AND STBD SPLITTER
GEAR DUPLEX
FILTERS, S/F MUST
REPLACE FILTER
ELEMENTS IN BOTH
UNITS. IMPACT:
FILTER
REPLACEMENT
REQUIRED TO
RETURN REDUCTION
GEARS TO
OPERATIONAL
CONDITION.

1

1

2

2

GARLOCK
3000

SHIPS FORCE
REQUIRES GARLOCK
BLUE GUARD 3000
1/8IN THICKNESS TO
COMPLETE REPAIRS
TO SPLITTER GEAR.

1

1

1

1

GARLOCK
3000

SHIPS FORCE
REQUIRES GARLOCK
BLUE GUARD 3000
1/4 IN THICKNESS TO
COMPLETE REPAIRS
TO SPLITTER GEAR.

1

1

1

1

VALVES
LEAKING

SPLITTER GEAR
VALVES RLO-V-105C
AND 106C LOCATED
ON UNDERSIDE OF
GEAR LEAK WHILE
OIL IS CIRCULATING
AND REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT.

2

2

2

8

S/F IDENTIFIED
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE GAGE FOR
NR 3 LUBE OIL
POWER PACK FILTER
ELEMENT IS OOC AND
REQUIRES
REPLACEMENT.
IMPACT: INABILITY
TO MONITOR LUBE
OIL FILTER
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE TO
DETERMINE FILTER
CHANGE OUT

2

2

2

8

PROPU
LSION
SYSTEM NR 3 LUBE
,
OIL PP
WATER
GAUGE
24711 JET
OOC
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REQUIREMENT.

20126EA
014250

3

PROPU
LSION
SYSTEM PORT
,
STEERABL
WATER
E
24711 JET
WATERJET

WHILE CONDUCTING
STEERING CHECKS IN
PREPARATION FOR
UPCOMING U/W, S/F
CYCLED PORT
STEERABLE
WATERJET 30
DEGREES TO STBD.
WHEN ATTEMPTING
TO CYCLE PORT
STEERABLE
WATERJET BACK TO
CENTERLINE, THE
INDICATOR WOULD
NOT MOVE. UPON
FURTHER
INSPECTION S/F
DISCOVERED THAT
THE FEED BACK
CABLE WAS BROKEN
AND THEREFORE
NOT ABLE TO SEND
AN INDICATION OF
WATERJET
MOVEMENT TO THE
INDICATOR.

2

2

3

12
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20126EE
021067

20126EE
021155

20126EE
021156

3

3

3

PMS IDENTIFIED NR 2
NAVLAN UPS OOC.
UPS BATTERY
REQUIRES
REPLACEMENT.
IMPACT: LOSS OF 1
OF 2 NAVLAN
SERVERS AND LOSS
OF REDUNDANCY TO
MPCMS UPON LOSS
OF SHIPS POWER.

2

2

4

16

LOCAL
OPERAT
ING
EQUIP
MPCMS
MENT,
UPS NR 1
PROPU
DEGRADE
25217 LSION
D

MPCMS UPS NR 1
DISPLAYING A CHECK
INVERTER FAULT.
CONTINUED T/S IAW
TECH MANUAL
INDICATES
BATTERIES REQUIRE
REPLACEMENT.
IMPACT: MPCMS UPS
NR 1 DEGRADED
UNTIL BATTERIES ARE
REPLACED.
FOLLOWING A LOSS
OF POWER, MPCMS
UPS NR 1 IS
DESIGNED TO
POWER I/O LOOPS
1P, 2P, 5P, AND 5A.

2

2

4

16

LOCAL
OPERAT
ING
EQUIP
MPCMS
MENT,
UPS NR 2
PROPU
DEGRADE
25217 LSION
D

MPCMS UPS NR 2
BATTERIES SHOW
SIGNS OF
DEPLETION. IMPACT:
MPCMS UPS NR 2
DEGRADED UNTIL
BATTERIES ARE
REPLACED.
FOLLOWING A LOSS
OF POWER, MPCMS
UPS NR 2 IS
DESIGNED TO
POWER I/O LOOPS
3P, 4P, 6A, AND 9A.

2

2

4

16

LOCAL
OPERAT
ING
EQUIP
MENT,
NR 2
PROPU
NAVLAN
25217 LSION
UPS OOC
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APPENDIX D
PLANNED MAINTENANCE TABLE
The following subset of Planned Maintenance Procedures were selected based on the incidence
of failure determined by the Pareto analysis of corrective maintenance, and then analyzed using
the Risk Matrix based on frequency, impact and degree of automation:

2331

4M-5

Diesel Engine Governor
Lube

1

2

1

2

4-M6

Inspect LO Pump

1

2

1

2

9M-1

Engine Test

1

4

4

16

M-1R

LO Sample

3

2

1

6

M-6

Inspect Air Filter

3

2

1

6

R-3D

LO Viscosity Test

4

3

3

36

W-1R

Inspect Loop Seal

4

2

1

8

Power Turbine LO Sample

1

2

1

2

Inspect LO Cooler

1

3

2

6

GT Oil Sample

1

3

1

3

Test GT LO Flash Point

4

3

2

24

Clean Air Filter

3

2

1

6

M-2

Replace Air Filter

3

3

1

9

R-34M

Test Air Flow

3

3

3

27

4

3

3

36

Stern Seal Leakage

4

3

2

24

Flash Point Test

3

3

3

27

Drain Water from Filter

4

3

2

24

Seawater Cooling

4

1

1

4

2341 8M-1
A-9
2342 A-1
W=2R
2418 M-1R

Reduction Gear Pilot Light
R-33D
2531 R-4D
R2-W
2471 R-10W
256

Table D-1. PMS Procedure Risk Matrix
From the PMS procedures determined to be high risk, the ones chosen for modeling are
indicated in BOLD in the table above. To allow for a broad spectrum of risk, one was selected
from each category.
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APPENDIX E
OPERATING PROCEDURES TABLE
From the Engineering Operating Procedures, a selection was made based on the corrective
maintenance Pareto analysis and these were analyzed using the risk matrix. The resulting
procedures are shown below:

EOSS
Nr.

Component

Title

Frequency

Impact

Degree of
Automation

Risk
Value

CAEPA

Electric Plant

Alignment
Procedures

2

3

4

24

FSST

Service and Storage
Tanks

Stripping water and
contaminants

4

2

3

24

FOMT

Fuel Oil Transfer
Pump

– Align for Remote
Operations

3

2

4

24

FOAS

Fuel Oil Service
System

Align for Operation
2

3

2

12

2

1

1

2

2

4

1

8

4

3

3

36

Operation, motoring

CPTM

Gas Turbine Brake

CPDM
E

Main Propulsion
Diesel

Starting/Operating/
Stopping

CLOP

Lube Oil Pumps

Starting/Stopping

CFOP

Fuel Oil Pumps

Starting/Stopping

4

3

2

24

BGTM

B Fire GTM

B Fire

1

3

1

3

CASF

Electric Plant

Bus Tie Parallel

4

1

4

16

CASSD
G

Cool Air

Failure

2

1

2

4

CASG

Gas Turbine
Generator

Fire

1

4

3

12

CSFG

Diesel

Fire

1

4

4

16

CED

Eductor

3

1

1

3

CFD

Fuel

1

4

3

12

Operation, motoring
Sample Detector
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CFOSS

Boats

Fuel

2

2

2

8

CFP

Fire Pump

4

3

1

12

CFMP
O

EDG

Console Operation

4

3

3

36

CHAA

CHT

Alarm

1

1

2

2

MLOL

Main Lube Oil

Pump Operation

3

1

4

12

CPTM

Console

Operation

1

2

2

4

CPWS

Potable Water

2

2

1

4

CFSRT

Fuel System

4

3

3

36

EPOP

Electric Plant

4

4

1

16

EPT

Power Turbine

Vibration

2

2

3

12

FOAS

Fuel Oil System

Align

4

2

3

24

GTES

Gas Turbine

Start

3

3

3

27

HBDG

Hot Bearing

Casualty Response

3

1

3

9

4

2

1

8

Operation, motoring

Operation, motoring
Refuel Helo
Operation, motoring

Operation, motoring
FPM

Fire Pump
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APPENDIX F
IMPRINT PROTOCOLS
The following notes pertain to the IMPRINT program that was used for this analysis.
Version: 4.6.54 dated December 2018
IMPRINT is a modeling program based on C# programming language; knowledge of C# is no
required to use the program, but some programming is necessary for more complex scenarios.
IMPRINT has three basic types of models:
•

Warfighter – Designed to model large crews at a macro level

•

Operations – Designed to model an operational mission (used for this analysis)

•

Maintainer – Designed to determine maintenance requirements

For this analysis we used the Operations Model to model the Watch and Work portion of the
Naval Allowance Factor (formerly Standard Navy Work Week). Each segment of the NAF was
built as a separate “Mission” for analysis.

Individual procedures (Planned Maintenance,

Corrective Maintenance, Operations) were designated as “Functions” and the steps of these
procedures “Tasks”.
Once a workflow analysis was performed on the task, using operator experience or known
information (for example, the duration of a Planned Maintenance Check is provided on each
procedure), the functions were entered in a notional sequence that simulated the normal flow of a
watch period.
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Figure A-1. Time and Accuracy Data Entry Fields

Tasks were then entered in sequence, with the following basic protocols:
The Time Criteria. A value was entered based on the workflow analysis as the expected time
required for that particular step. Where possible, this was based on the baseline for similar tasks
which is built into IMPRINT, where a variety of tasks are listed along with “standard” times and
the research reference that supports it. In cases where this was not available, reasonable estimates
were made based on operator experience. These could be refined in future studies, to include
observation of these tasks in-situ, where other factors could influence the execution.
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Success Criteria. This is for accounting purposes and does not determine success or failure for
the mission, however it may yield useful data for future analysis of individual tasks. As a
default, the analyst entered 85% for all tasks.
IMPRINT offers three options for entering the expected task time:
•

Enter Task Time: A fixed time chosen by the operator (Generally not used)

•

Use Expression: A user-entered expression (Generally not used)

•

Distribution: A pulldown menu with several options (Used for most tasks) o For most
tasks, a normal distribution was chosen, although others are available. This allows for a
more realistic simulation for multiple runs to account for performance of procedural tasks
by different personnel under variable conditions.

•

Mean: A reasonable estimate for the time expected for the operation – may or may not
match the time criteria entry

•

Standard Deviation: This was generally entered as 20% of the Mean, with a subjective
assessment of tasks with a wide range of variability entered as 30% and tasks with little
expected variation 10%

The next tab is titled “Calculate Task Success” and is used to enter data that could determine the
human error that may be encountered during performance of the task. Here again 85% was entered
as the default value for all tasks.
The same rules were applied (Normal Distribution, Mean and Standard Deviation) as in the “Time”
section.
This section also has 3 possible criteria to assess accuracy:
•

Percent Correct (not used)

•

Percent from Desired (not used)
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•

Number of Errors (Used in this analysis)

Based on the entries here, a “Probability of Success” is calculated and displayed.
The “Effects” tab is used to add conditions (Release Condition, Beginning Effect, Ending Effect)
that control the transition to the next task. For the majority of tasks in this analysis, no additional
entries were made here, but it is available for detailed tailoring, such as when two tasks have to
complete before another one starts. In these cases, basic C# programming language and protocol
was used.
The “Failure” tab allows entry of expected failure probability, and the results of this failure
(Mission failure, delay, inaccuracy, task repeat or reassignment), represented by percentages that
must total 100%. For most tasks, the “No Effect” was chosen, unless the task was a critical one,
and a percent failure was entered as appropriate, based on the Failure Analysis for that task
(specifically that step in the given procedure).
The “Crew” tab allows the selection of the applicable crew member (in this analysis RCO, EPT
and System). Automated tasks were color coded to show those that are performed by automation
vice an operator.
The “Taxon” Tab allows operator-entered values for the following: Perceptual, Cognitive,
Motor, Communication and allows the opportunity to map these to the workload values added in
the following tab.
The “Paths” Tab allows the operator to use single or multiple paths between tasks, including
options for multiple outcomes based on a percentage basis.
The “Workload” Tab allows the operator to assign values to each of the taxons based on empirical
studies – these are also compared in a matrix to indicate the extent that each one interferes with
the others at the various interface workstations. These values may be entered directly or based on
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pre-selected values from a pull-down menu. For this analysis the values were selected based on
the “swim lane” factors determined during the work flow analysis of each procedure. While not
exact correlations, the determination was generally straightforward.
The “Performance Shaping” tab has options for noise, heat, cold, vibration, sleep, and MOPP
level. These could be used to more closely model individual situations, with the sleep option
being the most closely aligned to the dimensions examined in this analysis. These factors can be
toggled on and off for comparison between successive executions of the mission. For this
analysis, the only PSF implemented was “Sleepless Hours” to model the effects of fatigue.
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APPENDIX G
SAMPLE TIME/MOTION ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
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APPENDIX H
SAMPLE CRITICAL FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
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